Task-oriented groups: A motivational and confidence approach to effective decision making by Matsuki, Naomi S.
THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT THE THESIS PREPARED UNDER MY SUPERVISION BY■ ■ ■ i' ' ■ • . | 
Naomi Stephanie Matsuki
EXTITt ED Tasl<~0rifcHted Groups? A Motivational and Confidence 
Approach to Effective Decision Making
IS APPROVED BY ME AS FULFILLING THIS PART OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
0*1364
Task-Oriented Groups: A Motivational and
Confidence Approach to Effective Decision Making
By
Naomi S. Matsuki
Thesis 
for the
Degree of Bachelor of Science 
in
Liberal Arts and Sciences
College of Liberal Arts and Sciences 
University of Illinois 
Urbana-Champaign
1993
Acknowledgments
First and foremost, I would like to thank my advisor.
Janet A. Sniezek for her advice, patience, and guidance. 1 
appreciate her constant encouragement throughout the project, 
especially encouraging me to share my own opinions without 
her making any judgments on them. This made me to become 
more confident in my work and ability. I would also like to 
thank Art Kramer for his support and all his "suggestions made 
in the margins." 1 think he does an outstanding job with the 
Psychology Honors Program. I also wish to acknowledge Kim 
Schneider for her constant help in the computer room. Lastly, I 
would like to thank the Champaign Police Department for 
providing me with all the statistics 1 needed 1 am very 
grateful for the opportunity to have worked with all of these 
individuals, without them, my project would have not been 
possible.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
introducuon.................................*..................... ....................................... 5
Method..........................................................................................  62
Participants......................................................................... 62
Procedure............................................................................ 63
Results........................................................................................................ 6 8
Discussion.................................................................................................. 7 6
References......................................................................................8 2
Table 1...........................................................................................89
Table 2........................................................................................... 90
Table2a.........................................................................................  92
Figure Caption. 94
Figures...........................................................................................96
Appendix A...................................................................................  108
Appendix B.................................................................................... 109
This study investigates two components of effective individual 
vs. group decision making: motivation/effort and confidence.
Motivation/effort refers to a resource allocation process in 
which commitment in the form of time and energy is 
distributed across competing acts. Confidence is the subjective 
evaluation of an individual or group's decision quality. A 
manipulation check shows that the presence of distracters has 
an effect on effort, subjects showed less effort with distracters 
and more effort without distracters. Effort, in turn, affected 
confidence. Results indicate that people who put forth more 
effort toward a task are more confident about their judgments 
than people who put forth less effort toward the same task. 
There are indications that groups were more confident than 
individuals, but these results are marginally significant. 
Contrary to past studies, there is no evidence showing that 
effort and confidence affected accuracy. Implications for the 
role of distracters in motivation/effort and for the link 
between motivation/effort and confidence are discussed.
Task-Oriented Groups: A Motivational and Confidence Approach
To effective Deeision*Miktng
Groups: An Introduction
All living things survivs collsctivsly: our natural habitat 
is ona example. Thera are a countless number of species where 
one member cannot survive without the cooperation from its 
other members. Goldfish in large numbers are better able to 
resist poisons in their habitat than is the lonesome one. A 
herd of deer can more readily cope with deep snow than can the 
individual member, and a flock of birds can survive where a 
single member of the species cannot. Mutual assistance by 
members of the same species is only one aspect of the process 
by which living things achieve collective survival. There are 
also times where cooperation by members of different species 
is fairly common. For example, it is very ordinary to witness a 
kind of parasite that lives jointly with its host in order for it 
to survive.
With these examples in mind, it is Important to realize 
that humans are no exception to the rule. Biologically 
speaking, it is obvious that humans cannot exist in this world 
without having another mate for reproduction. However, in the 
minds of social scientists, human's approach to collective 
action n n  be far more flexible. Humans can more easily
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change their behaviors to meat the constant demands of their 
environment, and can abandon one choice of action in favor for 
another that is considered more appropriate. Yet this 
decision-making process is much more complicated than it 
first appears, even contradictory at times. Consider, for 
example, the following pairs of adages offered by Steiner 
(1972).
Two heads are better than one, but 
Too many cooks spoil the broth.
The more the merrier, but 
Three is a crowd.
If you would have a thing well done, do it yourself, but, 
Jack of all trades, master of none.
In unity there is strength, but
A chain is no stronger than its weakest link.
These various (and conflicting) propositions reveal our 
society's long interest in the question of whether people work 
harder, think more clearly, learn more effectively and are more 
creative in the company of others or on their own (Brown,
1986). They demonstrate that our experiences give us lessons 
concerning the nature and consequences of collective behavior. 
Thus, the study of how individuals work together in deciding 
when collective behavior would be most productive is a 
beginning to understanding the group interaction process.
i fPiiw f iP  h p i  i  fp^  History ©t p i  wiCQr ”  i»p  
mdtviduat Theories after theories have aimed to comprehend 
how tha individual think* and behaves in certain situations. 
Scientists have observed and tested attitudes, decision­
making, self-evaluation, and other dependent variables on the 
individual level. These are important and valuable 
contributions to the behavioral science line of research, but 
what needs to be addressed is how these individual members 
can collectively work together in order to become a 
productive, unified entity.
When you look around you, groups exist everywhere.
Team sports such as football and basketball work together for 
the goal of winning, jurors have to decide on a verdict as a 
whole, and there am also parents' club committees who decide 
what policies are best for their children. Families are groups 
in which we live and eat together, and even a group of 
individuals trying to win a tug-of-war battle work 
collectively to achieve some sort of group objective. The 
American governmental system is a group decision making 
body in itself. In addition, much of the world's business takes 
place in groups. Top executives and the managerial teams 
constantly make vital decisions as a group everyday. Thus, 
even a short list like this proves to show why the research on 
groups is constantly increasing each year.
Hbssarchem mmm mm groups am vary important 
bbflPaso May are m  Wopping-stone# through which much work 
fats 4 btp, According IP lieGfath, groups am instrumeme (Or 
influencing, pupping, and changing the individuate WHO m  
the* mambars (1*4). So, interest in teaming about gratis a  
a natural consequence of how esaantial they pra in our
WWHI.
f tm  main focus of tNp papor is tha discussion i f  post
H b fM iir  iterator a Oaaiing wMh tha prooaaaaa and 
proOutfMty of taak-orianteO roups In tha first part, groups 
m $  *  daf tm  by leaking at tha various componoats which 
make a group There wW also be a discussion on tha various 
tasks which different groups perform and how they affect the 
network of group performance. Second, after a group knows 
the specific type of task If must perform, the Individual 
members of the group must then decide how they should 
allocate their time and effort to tha group teak. Thus, 
motivation will ba examined by referring to different aspects 
of this group phenomenon (e.g., social dilemmas, social loafing, 
goal-aatting). Third, we wHI examine non-motivational 
footers that affect group decision-making effectiveness (e.g., 
social influence). The final motion of this paper wiil examine 
hew groups evaluate their judgments and choices end see hew
t ?  - a * * -  ' i - vl Task-Oriented Groups
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they term their opinions on the success of these judgments and 
choices. These beliefs about the value of the individual's 
judgments are considered in light of their confidence. Finally, 
the confidence literature will be examined because we will 
want to see how the entire group process affects of confidence 
and in turn, how confidence influences the course of action the 
individual and group selects in subsequent tasks.
Definition Of A Group
What is a group? Collective action can involve as few as 
two persons or as many as a million or more. According to 
Davis (1969), it is commonly observed that group behavior is a 
function of three classes of variables: (a) person variables, 
such as abilities, personality traits, or motives (b) 
environmental variables that reflect the effects of the 
immediate location and larger organization, community, or 
social context in which group action takes place; and (c) 
variables associated with the immediate task or goal that the 
group is pursuing. Many researchers have attempted to 
classify groups by emphasizing one or the other of these three 
variables. For example, Jennings (1950) sate that groups 
competed of persons who have sought and maintained 
membership primarily because they are interested in the goals 
of the group are called socio-groups. Groups who have 
members that are in the group because they are somehow
attracted to one another are called psyche-groups. In addition 
to group goals, other researchers have defined group in terms 
of one or more of the following characteristics: motivation,
group organization, and interdependency. In terms of 
motivation, Locke (1991) for example, identified groups as 
moving through a sequence of seven key motivational concepts 
(needs, values, goals, expectancy and self-efficacy, 
performance, rewards, and satisfaction). In terms of group 
organization, McOavid and Harari (1968) define the group as an 
organized system of two or more individuals who are 
interrelated so that the system performs some function, has a 
standard sat of role relationships among its members, and has 
a set of norms that regulate the function of the group and each 
of its members. In terms of interdependency, Fiedler (1967) 
perceives the group as a set of individuals who share a 
common fate, that is, who are interdependent in the sense that 
an event which affects one member is likely to affect all. It 
appears that different theorists look at different aspects of 
the group. However, there is sufficient commonality among 
these definitions to show that they are all referring to the 
same basic concept: the group.
For our purposes, we will use Jennings' (1950) definition 
of socio-groups in which the individual members are willing to 
achieve some sort of common objective (e.g... completion of a
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certain task or producing a high quality product). This paper 
will also touch upon those aspects that were used to define 
the group discussed above. Now that we essentially know what 
constitutes a group, we can proceed to see how groups interact 
with one another and how each individual member influences 
the group and/or its other members and in turn, how the group 
itself influences each person in it.
Types Of Tasks
A group forms and maintains its existence for some kind 
of purpose. When this purpose ceases to exist, the group is 
likety to break apart and vanish unless the group finds another 
purpose. Of course there can be more than one purpose or in 
other words, groups can have more than one goal. Group goals 
are sometimes referred as group tasks. According to Shaw 
(1971), tasks and goals are two separate yet related elements.
The task faced by the group is intimately related to the group 
goal; to the extent that task completion will move the group 
toward its goal, the group members will be motivated to work 
toward task completion. The task, therefore, is what must be 
done in order for the group to achieve its goal or subgoal 
(Shaw, 1971).
There is no relevance In pursuing how groups perform 
together without knowing the type of task they must perform.
A group of military men in combat definitely have a different
Task-Oriented Groups
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task than a managerial team of a large corporation actively 
deciding on a merging offer. The former deals with the 
concept of winning while the latter demands a negotiable 
decision. For this reason, it is essential to classify tasks in 
order for us to know what processes are involved in what type 
of tasks. There are a number of different tasks and 
researchers have attempted to classify them in various 
categories. To take a couple, Steiner (1972) divided tasks into 
five categories to distinguish between divisible and unitary 
tasks: unitary, divisible, conjunctive, disjunctive, and
additive. Shaw (1973), on the other hand, proposed six 
dimensions along which group tasks varied: intellectual 
versus manipulative, task difficulty, intrinsic interest, 
population familiarity, solution multiplicity versus 
specificity, and cooperation requirements.
McGrath’s (1984) recent book provides the best overall 
summary of the current status of the group performance 
literature. He proposes a model of task types in his "group 
task circumplex" model. This model asserts that groups can do 
four things: generate ideas or plans, choose among 
alternatives, negotiate conflicts, and execute activities. This 
framework is diagrammed in Figure 1.
Task-Oriented Groups
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Insert Figure 1 about here
McGrath (1984) claims that the rationale behind this model 
was based upon the past work of Shaw, Carter, Hackman, 
Steiner, Shiflett, Taylor, Lorge, Davis, Laughlin, and their 
colleagues. As McGrath recounts, early distinctions among 
group tasks were relatively straightforward, such as 
distinctions between intellectual and motor tasks and between 
simple and complex tasks. As time passed, distinctions 
became more detailed and varied. This is the reason many 
researchers attempted yet somewhat failed to successfully 
classify all types of tasks. McGrath then attempted to 
combine these researcher's systems into one integrated 
scheme. Guzzo (1986) agrees that McGrath's Circumplex Model 
provides an excellent overview of theory and research on group 
tasks. He feels that McGrath adequately distilled just the 
important organizing principles from a lengthy list of 
descriptions of group tasks. He suggested that there are two 
basic dimensions of group tasks that underlie those existing 
descriptions. Guzzo (1986) provides a brief and accurate 
description of these two dimensions. One dimension is the 
presence of conceptual, as opposed to behavorial, demands of 
tasks, or "thinking* as opposed to "doing.* The second
Task-Oriented Groups
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dimension is the degree . which a task induces conflict as 
opposed to cooperation among group members. From this, 
McGrath breaks these two dimensions into eight types and used 
these types to review and discuss results of research on group 
performance.
Goodman (1986) also agrees that McGrath provided a good 
classification system since it has been found that the more 
general schemes (for example, McGrath) seem helpful in 
organizing knowledge about groups. Instead of classifying 
groups into mutually exclusive task categories, the scheme 
would be used to classify activities within a work group. 
Another reason why he favors this scheme is that it provides a 
way to organize knowledge about what we already know about 
groups. He also mentions that the task taxonomy serves 
another function: to serve as a moderator variable (Goodman, 
1986). In other words, groups differ in terms of their tasks.
As we change input characteristics of groups, such as size, we 
should expect differences in performance as a function of task 
characteristics.
Although many researchers unanimously agree that 
McGrath's Group Task Circumplex provides the best and most 
representable framework for classifying tasks, they also 
mention a couple drawbacks ami considerations (Goodman,
1986; Guzzo, 1986; Cummings, 1986). For example, Guzzo
Task-Oriented Groups
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(1986) believes that McGrath's account is an accurate 
portrayal of the existing descriptions of group tasks but it 
does not adequately describe group tasks as they occur in 
organizations: the predominant research method has been 
laboratory investigation. He believes that this method of 
investigation limits the nature of tasks open to investigation, 
such as restricting tasks to those of short duration, 
comparatively low complexity, and one-shot as opposed to 
cyclical performance requirements (Guzzo, 1986). In other 
words, Guzzo feels that categorization of tasks derived from 
laboratory studies are not fully applicable as descriptions of 
groups tasks in organizations because of there is a much more 
variety of tasks in a real organizational settings.
I think that Guzzo's comment about McGrath's model 
being ungeneralizable is not true. Of course there are 
limitations to laboratory experiments, yet there are also 
drawbacks on research methods conducted in natural settings.
I believe that the Circumplex Model d o ts  indeed apply to group 
tasks in organizational settings. Guzzo is correct by stating 
there are a wide variety of tasks in work groups, however, all 
these task types do fall in the model. The number of different 
types of tasks does not have an affect of whether they can fit 
into one category or another. Doesn't everyone in the entire
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world, with all of them having unique characteristics of their 
own, fall into two basic groups: male or female?
For all the previous reasons, I am going to follow 
McGrath's model to clarify the type of task we will address. 
Since it has been repeatedly argued that the nature of the task 
is a critical variable in determining group effectiveness, 
immediately deciding what type nf task is crucial in setting 
the foundation for this paper.
Determining how a company would like to present its 
image, crisis management, how to achieve and maintain 
employee morale, choosing whether or not to merge with 
another company, and determining a corporation's budget are 
only a few of the many decisions a work group must negotiate 
upon within an organizational setting. Where would these 
types of decisions be placed under within McGrath's model?
the closest match for these kinds of decisions are found 
in the second quadrant, Choose. Out of the eight task types 
that McGrath (1984) offers, we will be concentrating only on 
the subtype Decision-Making category. According to the the 
Circumplex Model, decision-making tasks are tasks that 
demand consensus. The correct answers are found by having 
the group come to a mutually acceptable decision. These tasks 
differ from the Intellective tasks by not having correct 
answers based on expert consensus, cultural norms, or on logic
Task-Oriented Groups
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and broadly known facts. Specifically, McGrath (1984) further 
defines the Decision-Making tasks:
A similar but less clearly distinctive set of subtypes can 
be distinguished within the Decision-Making 
category...the "correct" right or what is to be preferred. 
For some of these, answers draw on cultural values, 
presumably broadly shared in the population from other 
social influence processes operating among the 
particular individuals who are the group's members.
Still others may involve consensus attained by sharing 
relevant information (p.79)
It is fairly obvious that, for example, deciding whether a 
company should merge with another does not have a correct 
answer. No one will know if the final decision is correct or 
not until they have actually follow up on their decision and 
evaluate it. McGrath (1984) also claims that there are three 
advantages of these "no right answer" decision tasks over 
individual tasks: (1) by sheer numbers, they are more likely to 
have a broader range of skills and knowledge pertaining to a 
task, (2) a group provides the opportunity for an effective 
division of labor because the total amount of information to be 
acquired and processed may be vast, and (3) decisions reached 
by a group are more likely to be regarded legitimate than 
decisions reached by individuals. For our purposes then, we
will be referring to decision-making tasks throughout this 
paper. Establishing a specific type of task is the persistent 
thread that will determine how we should investigate the 
group process in the organizational setting. After a group 
realizes the specific decision-making task they must resolve, 
they would then need to decide how they should individually 
allocate their resources, in other words, decide how they 
choose to allocate their time and effor* The next section will 
address this issue.
Social Dilemmas
People make numerous decisions all the time, knowingly 
or unknowingly. It is not surprising to know that the topic of 
decision making is shared by many disciplines, including 
statistics, economics, political science, sociology, and 
psychology. Choosing what action to do as in how much effort 
an individual is willing to put forth in the group task is a 
dynamic process in which the individual continually evaluates.
In other words, there seems dilemma between a person's self- 
interest and the group interest. This is often labeled as a 
social dilemma.
But how are social dilemmas defined? According to 
Dawes (1980), social dilemmas are defined by two simple 
properties: (a) each individual receives a higher payoff for a 
socially defecting choice (e g. having additional children, using
Task-Oriented Group*
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all the energy available, polluting his or her neighbors) than 
for a socially cooperative choice, no matter what the other 
individuals in society do, but (b) all individuals are better off 
if all cooperate than if all defect. Similarly, Brewer and 
Kramer (1986) believe that social dilemmas appear in two 
basic forms: the public goods problem (in which the individual 
must decide whether to contribute to a common resource) and 
the commons dilemma (in which the individual must decide 
whether to take from a common resource). However, they later 
argue that the commons dilemma and public goods problem can 
be viewed as logically equivalent because of this rationale: To 
the extent that individuals are concerned primarily with the 
net outcomes of their actions, it should make no difference in 
structural terms whether their decision entails not taking 
from a common resource or contributing towards its provision, 
so long as the end result is the same (Brewer and Kramer,
1986). I agree with their reasoning because in both cases, 
individuals are considering the possible consequences of their 
contribution or acceptance to or from the collective good.
Now that wa have established an understanding of what a 
social dilemma entails, we need to know how this affects the 
individual's judgments and choices in group decision-making. 
This would involve having the individual make a choice in 
allocating his or her resources; choosing how to distribute his
or her effort into the group task. This may be determined by 
evaluating the content of some articles and reviewing results 
of studies involving social dilemmas.
On the individual level, it has been found by Brewer and 
Kramer (1986) that social identity, group size, and decision 
framing effect the choice behavior in social dilemmas.
Decision framing is also important m the Prospect Theory 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1983). In general, a preference for a 
sure outcome over a gamble that has a higher or equal 
expectation is called risk averse. The rejection of a sure thing 
in favor of a gamble of lower or equal expectation is called 
risk seeking. In short, it has been found that gains entail risk 
aversion and tosses entails risk seeking. The point here is that 
there are variables that affect a person's choice in 
distributing their effort. Effort toward a task is a crucial 
element for having high quality results. But what, in turn, 
affects effort? Another way of putting it, when and why does 
a person working in a group have a different level of task 
motivation or effort than when working alone?
To make explanations easier, I will begin by proposing a 
simple social dilemma scenario: Assume that John and two 
other co-workers, Tom and Stephanie were assigned to develop 
a campaign tor a new account. They all come from different 
departments of the advertising agency: John is a expert in the
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creative department, Tom works in the research department, 
and Stephanie is in the media department. Thus, all members 
must contribute his or her expertise in order for the group to 
achieve a successful campaign. There are three other similar 
groups that were assigned the same task. At the same time, 
all individual workers have their own projects to complete in 
their own departments. After a two week deadline, all four 
groups will present their campaign in front of a board. The 
'best” campaign will be used for the account and ail the 
members of that group will receive a substantial pay raise.
First of all, this is an example of a social dilemma since 
the pursuit of self-interest can lead to failure to successfully 
complete the group project. If either John, Tom, or Stephanie 
decides not to do his or her part in the group assignment, the 
group task will then become a failure since each person's input 
is crucial. If one of them acts upon self-interest, as in having 
their individual tasks in their own departments being a higher 
priority, the group as a whole will not perform optimally. By 
definition this would end in a collective disaster.
There are two mechanisms that underlie social 
dilemmas: the free-rider effect and the sucker effect. The 
free-rider effect is defined as a situation in which there is a 
possibility of some other member of a group that can and will 
provide a public good, making one's own contribution
Task-Oriented Group#
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unnecessary. Kerr (1983) provides an example of the free­
rider effect: in combat, soldiers in their foxholes may reason 
that someone else wil to lead the charge against the enemy, so 
there's little need for them to do so. This reasoning 
encourages them to stay in their foxholes and become what 
Olson (1965) called free riders. The other motivational loss 
was introduced by Dawes and Orbell (1981) labeled the sucker 
role. According to them, the sucker effect occurs when others 
in the group may profit as a result of your contributions 
without themselves contributing; the member who carries free 
riders is called the "sucker." Nobody likes to play the role of 
the sucker thus, they may end up not contributing to the group 
at all. To go back on the combat example, the soldiers in their 
foxholes may reason that if they fight, they may end up being 
killed for the benefit of those who would not fight; to avoid 
this outcome, they may simply choose not to fight (Kerr,
1983). If all members have either the free-rider effect or the 
sucker effect, it would inevitably end, by definition of a social 
dilemma, in a collective disaster. Together, the sucker and 
free-rider effects illustrate how complicated many social 
dilemmas can be.
Yet, how can one reduce the chances of having a 
collective disaster? One way is to offer an incentive. For 
example, Orbell and Dawes (1981) suggest that as long as
Task-Oriented Groups
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people are selfishly motivated, there is no other way to avoid 
the collective disaster except to alter individual incentives so 
that the situation is no longer a social dilemma. There are 
many ways to do this: coercion (e g., fines for those people 
who do not contribute or even receiving social disapproval), 
selective rewards (e.g.. various monetary amounts), and having 
the opportunity to communicate has also been shown to 
increase cooperative behavior. But the question still remains: 
how do social dilemmas lead to collective disaster?
Guzzo (1986) suggests that there are five major 
determinants of effective group decision making: the task, 
rewards, resources, autonomy, and having appropriate 
performance strategies. Group A's task is to complete a well- 
prepared campaign by the deadline required. We have already 
discussed the importance of tasks earlier, so now we will turn 
to the motivational aspects in which the rewards and 
resources apply to the social dilemma presented. To recall the 
underlying question again, why would one or more members in 
a group decide to put forth different levels of effort or 
motivation toward the group task? Or in other words, why 
would there be a substantial amount of motivational loss in 
certain group tasks, or in particular, in decision-making 
tasks?
Task-Oriented Groups
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Social Loafing
There have been numerous studies measuring group 
performance that have found that people exert less effort in a 
variety of tasks when they work collectively, in comparison 
w>th when they work individually: this is a phenomenon labeled 
social loafing. Social loafing has been studied under many 
conditions by different theorists: social loafing on difficult
tasks vs. simple tasks (Jackson and Williams, 1985), the 
effects of having an incentive (Shepperd and Wright, 1989), as 
being a complement of social facilitation (Harkins, 1986), the 
role of evaluation in eliminating social loafing (Harkins and 
Jackson, 1985), as a consequence of the type of task (Latane, 
1986), and so forth. The understanding of the cause and 
effects of social loafing is very important in trying to 
comprehend how people choose to distribute their time and 
effort.
Social loafing is in essence a diffusion of responsibility. 
According to this idea, individuals are less likely to behave 
responsibly if the responsibility is shared. The diffusion of 
responsibility can be understood within the larger context of 
Latane's (1981) theory of social impact, which deals with how 
an individual's physiological states, sub)ective feelings, 
motives, emotions, cognitions, beliefs, values, and behavior 
are affected by the presence or actions of other people in his
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or her environment. In many work settings, one or more 
employees are pressured to work hard from management or 
their supervisors. According to the social impact theory, it 
should be expected that responsibility will be diffused 
throughout the group and each individual will exert less effort 
than he or she would if alone (Latane, 1986).
But what leads individuals to loaf? Latane (1986) gives 
three possible explanations. One possibility is that people 
have learned from their previous group involvement that other 
people are likely to avoid work, therefore, they would decrease 
their own effort in groups in order to maintain equity.
However, this has been proven incorrect because it has bean 
found that individuals overwhelmingly predict that others will 
try harder in groups (Latane, 1988). The second explanation 
says that people would want to conserve their efforts until 
they were are required to do an individual task. This also has 
been proven wrong by an experiment conducted by Harkins, 
Latane, and WiHiams (1980). The last possibility is that by 
decreasing their input while exhorting others to increase 
theirs, individuals can increase their relative reward/cost 
ratio (Latane, 1986). This explanation has been supported from 
an experiment dene by Williams, Harkings, and Latane (1880) in 
which participants were led to believe that their relative 
contributions could be individually identified, almost
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eliminating the social loafing effect, in any case, such a 
phenomenon does exist and much has yet to be learned about 
social loafing in organizations.
There have been several lines of research which search 
for a way to eliminate or reduce the chances of social loafing 
effect. Such a study was done by Jackson and Williams (1985). 
They manipulated group task difficulty. They have found that 
working collectively enhanced performance on easy tasks, 
whereas those working co-actively performed better on simple 
tasks and worse on complex tasks (Jackson and Williams,
1985). Another study manipulated the incentive component 
(Shepperd and Wright, 1989). They found that social loafing 
occurred when subjects worked as part of a group, but only 
when an incentive was not provided. These remedies among 
others have proven to significantly reduce the probability of 
social loafing. However in my opinion motivational loss, such 
as the social loafing effect, cannot only be eliminated through 
the manipulation of one, two or three variables (for example, 
Harkins 8 Jackson, 1985; Jackson & Williams, 1985; Shepperd 
& Wright, 1989). I believe that there are many interacting 
variables Which affect a person's motivation or effort on an 
individual task and more importantly, on a group task. Fatigue, 
boredom, length of task, priority, and other extraneous 
variables may affect motivational loss. There is empirical
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evidence that addresses these variables but we will not 
discuss them in the present paper. However, it is imperative 
that further research investigating other possible explanations 
of the social loafing effect should be done.
In general, social loafing is associated with negative 
connotations. As Latane et al. (1979) stated, "We must confess 
that we think social loafing can be regarded as a kind of social 
disease that has negative consequences for individuals, social 
institutions, and societies" (p. 831). However, Jackson and 
Williams (1985) believe that social loafing may not always be 
a bad thing. In fact, social loafing has been shown to enhance 
performance by reducing stress in individuals working 
collectively on difficult tasks. In addition, one can point out 
that trying less Hard (social loafing) may improve performance 
in certain circumstances. Latane (1986) also believes that 
social loading may be beneficial from a group's perspective: 
Although loafing would seem to have primarily negative 
effects on short-term productivity, it is possible that 
its individual or long-range effects are more positive. 
Although the lack of individual recognition and control 
may lead people to dislike collective tasks, if people 
prefer work settings that allow for the sharing of 
responsibility, this potential may attract them to group 
tasks. It is therefore important to discover whether
social loafing can be eliminated only at the expense of 
individual satisfaction and enjoyment of the task (p.
302).
Motivational loss effects are not a reason alone to reject 
group tasks altogether. So far, we have seen where groups may 
produce more harm than good, yet groups make it possible to 
achieve many goals that individuals alone could not possibly 
accomplish. When the presence of others does help a group 
task, it is called social facilitation. As Harkings (1987) 
summarizes it, "The u su a l finding in social facilitation 
research is that working together leads to enhanced 
performance on simple tasks and debilitated performance on 
complex ones’ (p.4). Furthermore, he argues in his article that 
social loafing and social facilitation are closely related; 
actually, he believes that these two paradigms are in fact 
complementary. Specifically, this is the reason Harkins
(1987) gives:
In social facilitation research, when participants coact, 
their outputs can be compared and they work harder than 
participants working atone. In social loafing research, 
when participants coact, their outputs cannot ha 
evaluated, and they put out less effort than participants 
whose outputs can working together enhances evaluation
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potential; in social loafing, working together reduces it 
(P15).
In this case, these findings could be attributed to the effect of 
evaluation. It really depends on a lot of things whether groups 
can perform better than the individual (e g., the opportunity to 
evaluate, the difficulty of the task, reward or incentives, and 
so on). For the most part, it is logical to believe that groups 
and organizations do perform better than individuals, and most 
of us spend most of our lives in them. To iterate, collective 
action is a vital aspect of our lives (Latane, 1986).
Social Dilemmas Vs. Social Loafing 
When comparing social dilemmas and social loafing, one 
can see some similarities and differences between the 
phenomena. One difference between them is their definitions: 
social dilemmas are situations in which the rational pursuit of 
self-interest can lead to collective disaster (Kerr, 1983). The 
behaviors in social dilemmas are then applied to the concept of 
social loafing or more simply, motivational loss for an 
individual. Another difference is that social dilemmas have 
both the actions of contributing and receiving as choices an 
individual can choose to do. In contrast, social loafing is only 
concerned with a member's lack of contribution in a group. 
There are also a number of similarities between these 
concepts. First, both rely on the interdependence of group
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to some degree. If there is an overestimation of other 
members' effort, it tempts an individual to contribute less.
The end result may lead to a collective disaster (social 
dilemmas) or to a less than optimal outcome (social loafing). 
Second, there exists an unequal distribution of effort among 
the individuals within the group. Lastly, both refer to an 
aspect of motivation where individuals must allocate their 
time and effort toward a collective action. Remember, it is 
the motivational loss (eg., social loafing) that leads to a 
potential collective disaster (e.g., social dilemma).
It is often assumed that social dilemmas and social 
loafing present a conflict, usually between what the individual 
wants for him or herself and hew much he or she is willing to 
give toward the collective good. Yet there may times where 
they do not necessarily pose any conflict. For there
could be a dear set of priorities that an individual can have 
where the distribution of .lis or her time and effort is put 
forth in a certain event over another no matter what the 
consequences are. Or there could also be a negotiated 
agreement between the members of the group about how much 
they will each contribute. Sometimes the members are not 
aware that these phenomena are occurring; this is often the
case with social loafing (Latane, 1986). Therefore, an 
awareness of a conflict would also not be known.
Social dilemmas and social loafing are intriguing group 
phenomena which contribute to the understanding of group 
motivation. They help us gain deeper knowledge on how 
members might distribute their resources toward a group task, 
which in turn affects how hard they might work together. But 
more importantly, they demonstrate that the amount of an 
individual's work is dependent on the other members' work 
when realizing a collective goal.
So far in this paper we have focused on (1) what 
constitutes a group and why studying groups is important in 
our lives, especially in organizational settings (2) the typology 
of tasks was discussed and McGrath's (1984) Circumplex Model 
was specifically analyzed to build the foundation for the 
purpose of a collective action, (3) a motivational loss (social 
loafing efftct) in social dilemma situations (for example,
Jackson 8 Williams, 1985; Uatane, 1908; Orbell & Davis, 1981:
Olson, 1965; Sheppard & Wright, 1989), (4) compered and 
contrasted social loafing and social dilemmas, and lastly (5) 
social facilitation and social loafing were discussed together 
to suggest that they may compiemen* each other in the same 
design (Harkins, 1987).
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Now that we have discussed why there may be some 
motivational loss in group tasks, we shall identify the 
elements which actually enhance group performance by 
motivating members to work effectively together. More 
specifically, we want to know what variables affect 
commitment toward a group task. We would then question how 
and where social influence comes into play when members of 
the group are deciding on a decision-making task. But first, 
we must consider various theories about motivation.
Motivation And Commitment 
What is motivation? We have previously explained some 
conditions in which people experience motivational loss in 
social dilemmas without exactly defining what motivation is. 
For our purposes, we will be using the definition Naylor, 
Pritchard and llgen (1980) proposed: motivation is defined as 
the process of allocating personal resources in the form of 
time and energy to various acts in such a way that the 
anticipated affect resulting from these acts is maximized. 
They alto distinguished motivation and effort saying that 
changing motivation is essentially changing the dim ction of 
behavior, not amplitude (effort). This is different from what 
most theorists say; most theories imply that by increasing 
motivation, you increase effort on the task (Guzzo, 1988) The 
rationale behind Naylor et al. (1980) view is as follows.
Task-Oriented Groups
33
While it may be true that in a given time interval the 
person has exerted more effort to task relevant acts, our 
(Naylor, Pritchard, and llgen) position is that the overall 
level of time and effort commitment has not changed, but 
that the commitment has been reallocated in a more 
task-efficient manner (p. 164).
Although this may be a logical explanation the group decision 
tasks we are focusing upon m this paper, as defined earlier, 
are limited to occur at a given time interval. For our purposes 
then, we will refer to motivation and effort as the same 
concept.
Why should we study motivation? Guzzo (1986) gives a 
logical explanation as to why we should study group 
motivation as opposed to studying information processing or 
social interaction (which past theories related to group 
decision making focused on). He believes that since motivation 
is frequently cited to be an important factor in determining 
performance, then it should also be an important determinant 
for group decision-making performance: Motivation may play a 
significant role in driving information search behaviors, 
creativity, and other components of group decision making 
(Guzzo,1916). He adds that there are many factors that could 
influence motivation in decision making groups such as the 
importance of the task, incentives, member involvement and so
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on. Some of these factors were already mentioned and some 
will be discussed later. Future research should focus cn the
motivation aspect because there is ample opportunity to 
explore the causes and consequences of motivation in 
decision-making groups.
However, research on work motivation has become
increasingly complex and confused over the past several 
decades. Locke (1991) believes that the major cause for this 
confusion has been the existence of many theories with only a 
few frameworks trying to integrate them. Furthermore, he 
feels that a major reason for the difficulty of integration is 
that most of the theories pertain to different aspects of the 
motivational sequence (Locke, 1991). Thus, Locke (1991) 
offers his own motivational sequence covering many theories 
of motivation. In addition to Locke's framework, Naylor,
Pritchard and llgen (1980) also defines the motivational
process in a similar way yet adds three sets of contingencies.
In this paper, we will be using these two frameworks as 
guidelines to present the different aspects of the motivation
process.
Locke proposes a new motivation sequence and
integrative framework in which it presents all the major
theories of motivation:
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Insert Figure 2 about here
Needs. Looking at Locke's {1991} motivational 
framework, the sequence begins with needs. It is widely 
known that people have psychological needs (such as love, 
self-esteem) as well as physical needs (water, air). As a mean 
of survival, at) humans mua meat these two needs- Locke 
(1991) provides an appropriate liet of observation* which one 
can make about fhe nature and operation a t needs. M ire is a 
sample of some of tHese observations:
(1) Needs operate cyclically; they are never permanently
L i te  i f  A H v flU T lil*  ftC tl A t i l l t i t *  ite v u se w e
(2) Need fruetretion *  experienced as peso, dtecomtert,
or itlnaes.
(3) DMsasnt nasds entail different degrees of urgency 
(e.g.. ene cen: kae o<% 2-4 minutes without air but may 
surviea ter weeks without food).
(4 ) A given Med can la id  to many different actions (e#„ 
paopla try many things to get self-estaem or the illusion 
thereof).
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(5) Even though actions are ultimately motivated by 
needs, they may not, in fact, lead to need satisfaction 
(P-290).
As one can see. needs have many characteristics in which 
people can fulfill by different means. I feel that motivation to 
satisfy these needs is something that all individuals have. It 
is hard to imagine that there would be very much (if any) 
motivational loss in this part of the motivation sequence. The 
two most well-known need theories are Maslow's need 
hierarchy theory and Deci's intrinsic motivation theory. 
Maslow's hierarchy is made up of five major needs: (1) food, 
shelter, clothing, (2) personal safety, (3) acceptance, 
belonging, (4) self esteem, status, and (5) self-realization 
(Hill, 1991). Acco'ding to this model, one has to fulfill one 
level before an individual may be able to move to the next 
level. Deci (Deci & Ryan, 1985) has also proposed a need 
theory which asserts that people h ive innate needs for 
competence and self-determination Thus, recognizing needs 
is the first step in the motivatien sequence
mm  mtiwa^an y  The second dimension of Locke's 
framework is called Hie motivation core. In this pert, people 
have to discover Hie knowledge HUH survival requires, 
including a code of values to guide their choices and actions 
(Locke, 1991). Values can been seen as a link between needs
and the action in which an individual decides to take. There 
are three major motivation theories that take in account 
values and motives: McClelland’s need tor achievement theory.
Miner's role motivation theory, and Vroom's expectancy theory.
In terms of work motivation, McClelland's (1971) theory 
identifies values that are associated with successful 
entrepreneurship. Locke (1991) provides a tow examples die 
desire to achieve excellence as measured by some standard, 
the preference for moderate risk-taking, concrete feedback, 
and so on. Miner's (1978) theory identities a set of values and 
motives that characterize a successful persons in the role of a 
manager: desire to lead, taking on an assertive role, liking 
competition, and so forth. Locke (1991) believes that those 
two theories have had seme success in predicting action 
within toe realm in which toe theories apply.
Vroom's expectancy theory has also undergone 
considerable amount of research for the study of commitment 
decisions in groups. This theory argues that people act to 
mixifittoe their expected pleasure or satisfaction. In an 
organizational setting, the expectancy theory attempts to 
pradtot the total amount of effort the person will exert on the 
job. However, Naylor, Pritchard, and llgen (1980) pointed out 
one major problem with the expectancy theory in regards to 
motivation: predicting overall level of effort a parson exerts
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to the job ignores the way in which the total set of resources 
is allocated across acts; it ignores the fact that the patterning 
of the resource allocation process is critical to understanding 
behavior. Thus Naylor, Pritchard and llgen suggests a new and 
improved expectancy theory in their theory of behaviors in 
organizations. This NPI version of the expectancy theory will 
be examined more closely when we look at their theory later in 
this paper.
The motivation hub. The goal/self-efficacy/performance 
linkages is called the motivation hub. These three theories 
explain the direct determinants of action (Locke, 1991).
Following the arrows in Figure 2, expectancy and self-efficacy 
affect the goals people choose, but they also have direct 
effects on performance. In addition, goals/intentions are also 
direct motivational determinants of performance.
Goals and intantiana There has been a considerable 
amount of attention to the goal/intention line of research, 
especially to how goal setting affects motivation and 
performance. Research also has focused on the dimensions of 
goal-setting, such as goal difficulty, goal specificity, 
participation in the goal-setting process (e.g., Locke et at.,
1981; Tubbs, 1986), and the process by which goal-setting 
affects behavior (e.g., Naylor ft llgen, 1984). In Locke et al.
(1981) study, they have found that goals are mcst likely to
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affect performance under the following conditions: (1) range 
and type of goals (hard, or challenging goals improve task 
performance). (2) goal specificity (goals that are specific are 
better than vague goals), (3) ability, (4) knowledge of results 
or feedback (feedback is necessary if goals are to improve 
performance), (5) monetary rewards, (6) participation and 
supportiveness, (7) individual differences (e.g., high vs. low 
self-esteem persons), and (8) goal acceptance and choice. 
Although a few of these conditions do not have strong 
empirical support, they are all important aspects which 
researchers must consider before they conduct a study on 
goal-setting. More exploration of the nature and effect of all 
these factors in goal setting is clearly warranted (Locke,
1981). In addition to the general goal-setting studies, there 
has been some research on group goal setting as well (e.g., 
Pritchard et al., 1988; Koch, 1979). In the Pritchard et al
(1988) study, they found that group goal setting increased 
productivity 75% over baseline. In general, goal-setting has 
been consistently found to enhance performance.
Rewards- The outcomes cf group interaction are often 
described in terms of reward and costs. The concept of reward 
refers to those aspects which the individual finds pleasurable, 
enjoyable, gratifying, or otherwise satisfying (Shaw, 1971). 
The use of rewards can also be used to alter motivation and
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behavior. Recall that Guzzo (1986) suggests five determinants 
of effective group decision making: task, rewards, resources, 
autonomy, and appropriate performance strategies. Groups can 
attain their rewards on the basis of whether or not the group 
completed its task and reached its goat.
Rewards for group achievements can affect both the 
effort and coordination of a group; effort is then affected 
through the incentive value of the rewards (Guzzo, 1986).
When one thinks of an incentive value, they may immediately 
think of monetary rewards. Locke et al. (1981) say that money 
may be an effective method of improving performance, but the 
amounts involved must be large rather than small (e g., $100 
rather than $1). Money is not the only incentive. Pritchard 
(1988) stated that past literature on rewards found that both 
financial and nonfinancial incentives can indeed increase 
performance when the incentive system is properly designed. 
Rewards that an organization can provide groups include pay 
recognition, and time off.
Guzzo (1986) points out a couple disadvantages about 
reward systems. First, rewards for group performance are 
generally not very common in organizations. Second, rewards 
are more likely to be effective only when groups are intact and 
long-term. Rewards can be effective or ineffective depending 
on how they are used. Thus, as true for tasks, the proper
administration of rewards for group performance can be 
expected to facilitate effectiveness in decision making (Guzzo, 
1986).
Satisfaction. The last dimension of the motivation 
sequence proposed by Locke (1991) attempts to explain the 
determinants of work and job satisfaction. A number of 
theories try to find which job elements causes satisfaction or 
dissatisfaction in the work place. Hackman and Oldman (1975) 
developed the Job Diagnostic Survey to find what elements of 
the job motivates workers and brings the most satisfaction.
They argued that the most satisfying jobs possess 
characteristics such as personal significance, feedback, 
autonomy, and task identity.
Referring back to the motivation hub, goal-setting 
theories (e.g., Pritchard et al., 1988) and social-cognitive 
theory both view goal not only as objects or outcomes to 
strive for but they can also be used as standards for evaluating 
an individual's performance. Thus, according to Locke (1991) 
goal success is viewed as leading to self-satisfaction and 
failure to self-dissatisfaction (p.294).
The motivation sequence, hub, and core is not a one-way 
process. It a cycle in which organizational commitment is the 
connecting loop that brings the employee back to the beginning 
of the cycle. Actually, Locke (1991) argues that the sequence
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really begins with goals rather than needs or values because 
intervention at the need stage is impossible since needs are 
innate.
Comments On The Model
I believe this model is very successful in integrating 
previous models of motivation. It is simplistic yet it 
effectively demonstrates and explains how different theories 
pertain to different elements of the motivation sequence.
Locke (1991) adds that *any given theory may be correct or 
incorrect in one or more of its tenets, but even when correct a 
given theory is more likely to complement than to be at odds 
with other theories* (p.295). On the other hand, I feel that 
there is an element that did not receive attention in the model: 
confidence. Confidence should and does play a critical role in 
determining if and how certain choices will be used by the 
decision makers, thus, it should be included in the motivation 
hub in Locke's model. Confidence will be defined and discussed 
more in detail later in this paper.
The Motivation Process: A Theory Proposed by Naylor, 
Pritchard and llgen (*NPI Theory*)
The second framework of the motivation process that 
will be discussed is offered by Naylor, Pritchard and llgen 
(1980). According to their model, the major constructs 
associated directly with the motivation process are basic
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noods. temporary naod stata-arousal, and alteet. all of which 
food into tha valance of outcomes; the three sets of 
contingencies, plus the utility of products, utility of acts, and 
the resulting actual acts (Naylor et al., 1980). Switzer and 
Sniezek (1991) believe that the NPI theory is very useful for 
research for the reason that it explicitly takes into account 
the role of judgement and decision making in explaining task 
motivation.
Recall in Locke's motivation sequence, Locke used 
Vroom's expectancy theory to help define the motivation core 
(values and motives). Yet Naylor et al. (1980) have found one 
major problem with this old expectancy theory which was also 
discussed earlier. Attempting to correct this problem, Naylor 
at al. suggested a new and improved expectancy theory.
Sniezek, May, and Sawyer (1990) believe that this new 
expectancy value theory is practical for studying group 
commitment for two main reasons: (1) commitment is 
operationalized in terms of behavior following from decisions, 
not affect and, (2) the theory gives special treatment to the 
decision maker's expectations-expectations regarding the 
relationship between allocation level to an act and the 
consequent reward are represented by a series of contingency 
relations (p. 2). These contingency relations provide a useful
understanding to the motivational line of research in which we 
will now see.
Although this model involves many constructs that 
directly affect the motivation process (e.g., valence or 
anticipated affect) we will not discuss them in detail; we will 
refer to them when necessary. Thus, for simplicity sake we 
will only concentrate on the three major points at which 
contingency judgments occur in this model, act-to-product, 
product-to-evaluation. and evaluation-to-outcome. Some 
examples of the contingency functional relationships are 
shown in Figure 3.
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Insert Figure 3 about here
Act-To-Product These are the perceived contingencies 
between a person's acts and the results of these acts 
(product). In other words, the act-to-product contingency 
relationships involve the relationship between the amount of 
personal resources (e.g., time and energy) devoted or 
committed to the act and the level of quantity and quality of 
the product produced (Naylor at al., 1980). Examples A-l show 
some act-to-product contingencies. In example H, the 
relationship is an inverted ll-shape function. This is when high 
levels of time and energy (effort) result in less of the product.
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Product-To-Evaiuation The contingency here is between the 
products produced by the individual and the evaluation ot his or 
her performance. Naylor et al. (1980) proclaim there is a 
number of different evaluators that exist: examples include a 
supervisor, manager, a subordinate, or even the person himself 
or herself. Naylor et al. describes an important assumption 
when addressing the evaluation system:
A central tenet of this theory is that this evaluation 
system is intimately associated with the concept of 
roles. That is, the evaluation system used by a given 
other (or the person himself or herself) is related to and 
indeed defines the role that other has for the individual. 
This evaluation system defines the products the person 
is expected to produce, and also describes their relative 
importance (p.39).
Some product-to-evaluation contingency examples are shown 
in J-Q in Figure 3.
Evaluation To-Outcoma The third set of contingencies 
(evaluation-to-outcome) reflect the external reward system 
as perceived by the individual. These contingencies are th» 
person's perception of how his or her performance is reflected 
into outcomes from the environment (Naylor at al, 1980). 
Examples R-X depict these contingencies. In example U, there 
is no relationship between favorableness of the evaluation and
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the level of the outcome, but some constant level of outcome 
is always received (e g., pay levels for hourly employees). 
Com m iflii on th i Three Sets of Continganciia Each of these 
three contingencies is formed in three different ways making 
them distinct, yet they also share some ' ommori features: 
they are perceived contingencies that may not reflect the 
actual state of things: they are the building blocks for rational 
behavior; and they are capable of change as the person gains 
more experience in the environment, as the environment itself 
changes, or through verbal mediation (Naylor et al., 1980). The 
components of the NPI theory, especially the contingencies 
found in the motivation process are useful tools in 
establishing a basis of the resource allocation process. The 
resource allocation process, as we know, is the key for 
studying task motivation or the group decision-making process 
as a whole.
So far, motivation has been a prominent issue in this 
paper. Specifically, we have examined two major frameworks 
of task motivation: Locke's (1991) motivation sequence and 
integrative framework, and the NPI theory involving how three 
sets of contingencies affect the resource allocation process. 
Although we have chosen the type of task we are interested in 
(e.g., Mcgrath's decision-making task), we have not discussed 
in depth the group decision making process itself. The aim
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here was to find out how and why individuals choose to 
allocate their resources or distribute their time and effort 
when involved in a group decision making task. This is not to 
imply that the process is unimportant: it is. Thus, we will 
now turn to the group decision making literature. In other 
words, we have studied how groups work harde r but now we 
are interested in how they work sm a rte r.
Decision-Making Process
Before we can see how groups can be effective without 
considering the motivational component, the decision-making 
process must be reviewed. The purpose of a decision-making 
group is appropriately described in a few sentences by 
Josephine Klein (1963):
The task of a decision-making group is to reach 
unanimous agreement on a course of action. Such 
agreement depends on a unique combination of the value 
of the members and the facts at their disposal. The 
decision-making sequence therefore requires exchanges 
of information and of views before agreement can be 
reached. All other contributions to the discussion are 
irrelevant to the problem under consideration and must 
be treated as expressive of personal idiosyncrasies (p.3) 
According to Simon (1977), decision making is made up of four 
types of activity: intelligence, design, choice, and review.
Guzzo (1986) explicitly explains each of these phases. The 
following are brief descriptions of these four activities: the
intelligence phase involves determining when decisions should 
be mad* when given a wide variety of circumstances: the 
design phase is concerned with creating, developing, and 
assessing possible courses of action; choice refers to the 
process of choosing one course of action from those presented 
in the design phase; and the fourth phase, review, involves 
monitoring pas: choices to see if chosen actions are properly 
implemented and to determine if new decisions must be made 
(Guzzo, 1986).
The intelligence and design phssss are concerned with 
recognizing a decision-making task (eg., social dilemma) and 
having possible courses of action ( if . ,  verdict being guilty or 
not guilty). These first two phases are relatively simple and 
comprehensible- On the ether hand the third and fourth stages, 
choice and review, have troth received * great amount of 
research attention. Therefore, the lest section of thi* paper 
wifi dieeues hew groups choose courses of eetien (by meens of 
social influence) to awhievo group decision making 
effectiveness. We wW also examine hew group members end 
groups evaluate the 'goodness* of their performance or 
product
Non-Motivational Factors Affecting Group Effectiveness
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By this time, we have gained an understanding on how 
motivation play a major role in explaining how groups work 
together. This is in terms to how much each member 
contributes to the group task. Just knowing how hard a group 
works together is not sufficient enough to know whether it 
will be effective. For example, imagine a group whose 
members are all history majors. As a group task, they were 
assigned physic and mathematical problems to solve within 
ten hours. Even though they may have worked hard together and 
had a lot of motivation to finish, there is a great possibility 
that they would not have solved as many of these problems as 
opposed to if they were assigned history questions for two 
hours instead. The point here is that effort and motivation 
together is net the only element a group can rely on in order 
for it to be successful, there are other components as well.
Non-motivational factors that contribute to group 
effectiveness includes ability or expertise of members, 
equality of contribution, group cohesiveness, and social 
influence. Ability or expertise of members and group 
cohesiveness are both part of group input. Group input is what 
is true about the people in the group. For example, members in 
• group do not become experts in the field of psychology, per 
se, during the time they interact in a group. Input Me the 
characteristics or feelings that the individuals have when
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entering in the group. On the other hand, equal contribution and 
social influence are part of the group process. These are the 
things that an individual experiences when interacting in a 
group. In the subsequent section, the impact and contributions 
of social influence will be discussed. I have chosen to further 
explain this element because I think it adequately shows how 
one of these non-motivational factors (out of several including 
the ones introduced above) could have great impact on group 
effectiveness.
Social Influence Brown (1988) suggests that groups are 
motivated to establish and maintain uniformity in the group.
For many years, 'social influence in groups' was referred to as 
'conforming to the majority,' thus, there was an emphasis on 
majority influence in the sense of 'prevailing.' In addition,
Brown (1988) believes that the main explanations for this 
conformity to the majority suggest that three main 
motivations are at work: the need to depend on others for 
information about the world and to test the validity of our own 
opinions; the achievement of group goals which is facilitated 
by • uniformity of purpose; and the need for epproyal arising 
out of not wishing to seem different (pl22). From this 
perspective, I think it is very insightful to see how social 
influences (the majority) cen affect different aspects of
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motivation. More simply, the majority position 'motivates' 
individuals to accept the position it proposed.
In various studies, the focus of research has recently 
switched to the minority influence. Minorities, it turns out, 
are not not completely passive recipients of influence from 
the majority but can elicit some impact on group members 
(Moscovici et al., 1985). Similarly, Nemeth (1986) found that 
there are differential contributions of the majority and 
minority influence to persuede individuals to take a certain 
position. For example, he found that majorities do exert more 
influence in the sense of prevailing and people are much more 
likely to adopt the position the majorities proposed. However, 
those exposed to the minority viewpoints are stimulated to 
think in more divergent ways; they are more original, they use 
a greater variety of strategies, they detect novel solutions, 
and more importantly, they detect correct solutions (Nemeth,
1986). In short, people tend to be h o tte r decision makers 
because they attend to more aspects of the situation and 
reexamine premises.
An interesting contribution of the majority was 
introduced by Asch (1956). In his experiment, he used 
confederates to form the majority condition. The majority 
view was clearly incorrect but the subjects still adopted their 
view. Asch found that there was a strong willingness to 'go
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along with' the majority and that, according to him, was 
precisely the motivation behind most of the conforming 
responses. Furthermore, Asch found that subjects lacked 
confidence in their own judgement, assuming that the others in 
the experiment were privy to some additional information that 
was guiding their responses (1956). This finding among the 
others suggest that social influence does have a great impact 
on group decision-making effectiveness (e.g., better quality 
decisions, more creativity). Asch's specific finding on how 
social influence directly affects the confidence of group 
members is of particular interest in this paper. Thus, the 
confidence literature will be examined more closely in the 
following section.
Rationale For The Confidence Literature Review 
Recall the motivation sequence model proposed by Locke 
(1991). He placed satisfaction as the final segment of the 
process and then he believes that the individual or the group 
returns back to the beginning of the cycle (to goals or values).
This is a very representable integrative framework of many 
cognitive and work motivation theories, but I feel that there is 
another element that should be a part of this sequence: the 
confidence research.
Before I describe confidence research, I would like to 
propose some underlying rationale as to why I feel confidence
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should be another crucial aspect that should be added to the 
motivational research. It has been previously suggested that 
one of the major sets of contingencies, the product-to* 
evaluation contingency, in Naylor, Pritchard and llgen's (1980) 
theory was defined as the relationship between the products 
produced by the individual and the evaluation of his or her 
performance. In other words, what are the individual's beliefs 
about the quality of this product? Beliefs about how good a 
person's judgments or choices are can be labeled the 
confidence an individual holds about his or her own judgment 
or choice (Sniezek, 1991). On a group level, Sniezek (1991) 
describes two types of confidence: member and group 
confidence. Member confidence is each individual's confidence 
about me group's choice and group confidence is the group's 
confidence about the group's choice.
In addition to the motivational research, confidence 
should also be an very important element in decision-making. 
For example, Simon (1977) had a review process as one of me 
four phases in his decision-making sequence. To reiterate, 
activities in the review phase involves monitoring past 
choices to see if chosen actions are properly implemented and 
to determine it new decisions must be made (Guzzo, 1986). 
Again, confidence can be integrated in this phase because the 
individual not only reviews past choices, he or she also sees if
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those choices were ’ right.* And lastly, we have seen how other 
factors, such as social influence, can have a tendency to affect 
how confident an individual would feel about his or her 
decision. For these reasons, it is surprising to see the 
confidence literature as a fairly new line of research since 
choice and evaluation have been important constructs in 
various motivational and decision-making theories.
Qrouo Evaluation Before a group can be confident, it first 
needs to know what criterion it can be confident about. More 
simply, how does a group measure the quality of their 
judgment? Einhorn, Hogarth and Klempner (1977) define the 
quality of performance in terms of how close the group 
judgment is to the true or actual value being predicted once it 
is known. They offered four different models to demonstrate 
how groups evaluate the quality of their performance. Einhorn 
et al. (1977) describes each model:
(a) randomly picking a single individual
(b) weighting the judgments of the individual group 
member equally (the group mean)
(c) weighting the "best* group member (i.e., the one 
closest to the true value) totally where the best is 
known, a priori, with certainty
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(d) weighting the best member totally where there is a 
given probability ot misidentifymg the best and getting 
the second, third, etc., best member (p.158)
The authors developed these models to simply say that if 
groups were to use one of these models under a certain 
condition, then a certain level of performance would result. 
These four models give a good foundation for other researchers 
to begin understanding how groups evaluate their performance 
and then form their confidence about it.
Group Confidence Research Sniezek (1991) states that there 
are two characteristics of a group who faces a decision 
making task:
First, the members of the group share the objective of 
maximizing the quality of their decision with respect to 
some identifiable criterion, and second, the group 
operates under uncertainty about which alternative is 
superior throughout the task...hence, the group's own 
evaluation of its product is often an important-and 
sometimes the only ingredient in determining group 
effectiveness (p. 4).
These two features are consistent to what we have been 
examining throughout this paper. The members of the group 
want or are very motivated to reach an optimal decision (e.g., 
sharing the same objective) and the groups are assigned to a
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decision making task which, according to McGrath (1984), is 
defined as tasks for which the preferred or agreed upon answer 
■s the correct one--a 'real' correct answer is not known to the 
members (e.g., groups under certainty). In addition, confidence 
is thought of as the evaluation of the product and as stated 
previously, confidence is an important criterion to measure 
group effectiveness. Thus, groups with these two features 
offered by Sniezek (1991) will be used in the present study.
How do we measure group and member confidence? First 
of all, Sharp et al. v 1988) distinguishes two types of 
probability assessments: calibration is the ability to
appropriately assign probability levels to judgments (or 
answers) and resolution, on the other hand, refers to the 
judge's ability to discriminate between right from wrong 
answers by assigning confidence judgments to right and wrong 
answers. Sniezek (1991) tells us how we can use calibration 
in order for us to measure group and member confidence:
In situations in which objective decision quality cannot 
be known, group confidence can be described only in 
terms of its absolute level (e.g., how confident a group 
is), or its magnitude relative to confidence assessments 
from another source, such as from individuals. But with 
the availability of information about outcomes, group 
confidence can be described relative to the actual level
of decision quality (9.g., how over- or under confident a 
group is) (p. 7).
In the present study, we will describe group confidence 
relative to the actual level of decision quality for the reason 
being we will be conducting a laboratory experiment. This will 
then allow us to measure group confidence by allowing us to 
compare the actual answer to the one chosen by the group.
Qver/undar confidence. Over/under confidence have been 
common occurrences in difficult decision making tasks. 
Over/underconfidence is defined as the difference between 
degrees of belief (subjective probabilities) and a relative 
frequency (percentage correct) (Gigerenzer, in press). For 
example, the overconfidence effect occurs when the mean 
confidence is higher than the percentage of correctly answered 
questions. Why do people or groups experience this 
over/underconfidence effect? It has been said that the use of 
several people deciding on a decision-making task (by sheer 
numbers only) may increase confidence in judgments.
However, this does not necessarily increase judgment accuracy 
(Gigerenzer et at., 1992; Sniezek, 1991). Also, the effects of 
choosing on confidence suggest that overconfidence is most 
likely to be severe in spontaneous, less contemplated, choices 
(Sniezek et al., 1990). Another possible source of 
overconfidence may be framing. For example, as suggested by
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Koriat, Lichtenstein, and Fischhoff (1980), overconfidence may 
be due to a biased search for confirming evidence prior to 
choice, as well as selective attention to confirming evidence 
following choice. Thus, framing could lead to overconfidence 
because of biases either in the generation of evidence prior to 
choice or in the evaluation of evidence following choice 
(Sniezek et at.. 1990). I believe this is a very good point: 
confidence may be evaluated before and after a decision is
made.
I think there are numerous reasons as to why people may
feel over* or underconfident about their choices or judgments 
such as general biases in information processing (e.g., 
confirmation bias), increased group discussion, groupthink, or 
perhaps having expertise on the subject, and so on. The point 
of the matter is that this phenomenon does exist. As a result, 
it may have detrimental effects such as developing inaccurate 
judgements. So how can individuals and groups improve their 
oMbration and resolution skills?
Sniezek and Henry (1989) found that group judgments 
ware, with a few exceptions, significantly more accurate than 
mean or median individual judgments. Their reasoning to this 
iS that there are two factors related to increase accuracy in 
groups, (a) high disagreement, e.g., large variance, in initial 
judgments, and (b) group judgments outside the range of initial
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individual judgments. In addition to being more accurate, 
groups were generally more confident confident than 
individuals. I think this explanation of more accurate 
judgments in groups have the same effects of the minority 
influence. Recall #iat a movement toward the minority 
position in groups dees lead, in general, to more accurate
Sherp. Cutter, end Panrod (1SM) examined whether 
feedback concerning Pro appropriateness of confidence
lodgments improves calibration and resolution skills. Their 
hypotheses that the feedback reduces overconfidence and 
improves calibration was not supported, however, they found 
that feedback does improve resolution skills across sessions. 
Sharp at at. (1988) admitted that their experiment in testing 
whether feedback influences over/underconfidence or 
calibration was very weak. Thus, a more reliable method 
might find different results and conclude a poesibia 
significant interaction between feedback and improved 
calibration shifts. It is important to note that overconfidence 
in groups is not always dangerous, it can also be useful in 
some situations. What needs to addressed, according to 
SftiaaaM ttSI), i# hot to place great amphasis on high group 
confidence, but to study appropriate group confidence. This is 
a more reasonable question to investigate because it is
Task-Oriented Groups
60
common knowledge that there are certain situations wht'e 
high confidence may he beneficial (e g., test taking).
A question that often arises when examining the 
confidence research is, does group satisfaction after 
completing the task lead to high group confidence? Sniezek 
(1991) claims group members could be satisfied with the 
process (or the fact that they reached some decision), but 
highly uncertain about that decision. The difference is that 
satisfaction is an attitude toward the task, process, or 
decision and confidence is a belief about the quality of the 
decision. Maybe a more interesting question would address the 
reverse, is a highly confident group necessarily have to be 
sa tisfied?
A Motivational Perspective On Confidence Group members, 
when together, tend to give greater time and effort to decision 
making tasks than if any one of them completed it alone. Data 
have supported the idea that greater time and effort exerted by 
an individual will reduce their subjective uncertainty 
(8niesek,1990). On the other hand, it is possible for an 
individual to have more confidence if they have exerted more 
time and effort into a certain task? Take this one step 
further, will a group have high confidence if they put forth a 
high level of effort? This becomes the main issue at hand.
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Summary And Discussion
This paper addressed several issues concerning task- 
oriented groups. First of all, organizational work group 
behavior should be an important line of research because 
groups exist everywhere and through them, work is 
accomplished. They share a common goal of completing a 
specific decision making task. I have chosen to focus on 
McGrath's definition of the decision making task where the 
"correct" answer is the preferred or agreed upon answer. The 
second part of this paper centered around motivation in which 
we aimed to find out how and why individuals choose to 
allocate their resources or distribute their time and effort 
when involved in a group decision making task. Specifically, 
social dilemmas and social loafing were defined and in 
addition, Locke's motivation sequence, hub and core and the NPI 
theory were discussed in detail. To re-iterate, these 
motivation components gave insight on how hard groups work 
together. The third section of this paper then focused on how 
groups work smarter on decision making tasks. The decision­
making process was defined and in addition, non-motivational 
factors affecting group effectiveness (e.g., social influence) 
was also examined. The final section centered around the 
group confidence research. Although confidence is • difficult 
phenomenon to study within the behavioral science line of
Task-Oriented Groups
62
research (e g. determining the causes and cures for 
overconfidence), it should be an important element within the 
motivation research as well as being part of the decision 
making process. Potential relations may exist between these 
concepts, thus, future research is necessary to explore this 
issue.
Method
Participants
The 123 subjects who participated in the study were 
randomly drawn from a subject pool of undergraduates enrolled 
in an introductory psychology class at the University of 
Illinois at Urbane-Champaign. The age range was 18-22 and 
there were 51 males and 72 females. Year in school also 
varied (freshman-83, sophomores-21, juniors-13, seniors-6). 
They took part in this research as a means of partially 
fulfilling a course requirement. The participants were run in 
groups of three or they did the experiment individually. They 
were randomly assigned to one of four conditions: 
group/dieiracted (GO), group/non-distracted (GN), 
individual/distracted (ID), and individual/ non-distracted (IN). 
Each of the conditions consisted of 34 groups (14 distracted 
and 14 non-distracted; N-102) and 21 individuals (10 
distracted and 11 non-distracted).
P ro c e d u re
The research location was a large central room attached 
to four smaller rooms. Each room was equipped with a round 
table, three chairs, and a one way mirror. They also had doors 
to ensure seclusion from the other groups. In addition, there 
was a fifth room which overlooked the other four rooms. The 
experimenter was able to watch all the subjects 
simultaneously through the one-way mirror during the second 
part of the experiment. Upon arrival at the experiment, each 
participant selected a plastic paper clip out of a bag and was 
seated in the largest room. The bag contained clips of four 
colors: red, blue, green, and yellow. The number of clips 
inside the bag was equal to the number of subjects present for 
the experiment. This process determined the person's small 
group or individual assignment. Depending on the color of clip, 
the experimenter handed out the different packets. Red and 
blue clips were handed the distracted condition packet and the 
yellow and green clips were handed the non-distracted packet 
condition.
Before the groups were formed, general instructions for 
persons in all four conditions were handed out. For example, 
persons in the group/distracted condition read the following:
"In your packet you will find the following: a consent form, a 
pen, and two questionnaires labeled A and B. Please make sure
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you have all of these items. If you are missing any of them, 
inform the experimenter at this time. These are the general 
instructions for this experiment. Please read them thoroughly 
and further instructions will be given later.
Step 1: Read carefully and sign the consent form.
Step 2 : Fill out questionnaire A individually.
Step 3: After completing questionnaire A, you will form 
groups of three which witl be determined by the color of 
your poker chip. Red chips will go to room one, blue 
chips to room two, yellow chips to room throe, 
snd green chips to room four. When you are in your 
group and in your assigned room, there will be a 
questionnaire on the table for your group to answer. One 
group answer sheet is provided. This is the same 
questionnaire as questionnaire A, but you will be 
answering it as a group. You will answer the questions 
to the best of your group's knowledge. Your group will 
have ten minutes to complete the questionnaire. USE THE 
TIME HOWEVER YOUR GROUP WANTS TO. After the ten 
minutes, the experimenter will then collect your group's 
answer sheet.
Step 4: The experimenter will tell you when to start 
questionnaire B. You wUI fill this out individually.
Once you have read these instructions, please start step 1."
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(See Appendix A for instructions for the other three 
conditions). When it was clear that all subjects had read and 
understood these instructions, they read and signed the 
consent form and started on questionnaire A. Once 
questionnaire A was completed by all subjects, they were 
directed to go to their assigned rooms. Before they entered 
the rooms, the experimenter orally instructed the subjects. In 
all distracted conditions, the experimenter told the subjects, 
"Remember that you (or your group) can use this time however 
you want. You (Your group) does not have to finish the 
questionnaire." In the non-distracted condition the 
experimenter recited, "Please use all of this time to answer 
the questions to the best of your (your group's) knowledge." In 
all the experiments, the experimenter was consistent when 
she orally instructed the subjects. All three questionnaires 
(two individual A.9; one group C) contained an information 
sheet on lesal crime and had 8 main questions concerning 
statistics of the local crime rate of Champaign, Illinois. Each 
question had three parts. First, the individuals or groups were 
asked to state their best estimates to forecast the future 
crime statistics of the same city. Second, subjects were 
asked to set confidence intervals around their individual or 
group judgments. We label this new variable Uncertainty. The 
equation for this is Uncertainty • upper limit - lower limit.
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The smaller the uncertainty, the more confident the individual 
or group is. And lastly, using a Richert scale ranging from 1-9 
(1-not at all confident, 9-very confident) they also circled 
how confident the group or individual was on their/his/her 
estimate. We will call this as the Confident Rating variable. 
(See Appendix B for an example of a questionnaire question). 
During the ten minutes the group or individual was completing 
the questionnaire, the experimenter watched the subjects from 
the fifth room. All four rooms had a one-way mirror allowing 
the experimenter to observe all conditions at the same time. 
Notes were taken for all the distracter conditions by the 
experimenter. The time for each activity (games, magazines, 
comics, task, other) was recorded every minute. The "other* 
category included activities such as the subjects talking with 
each other, subjects sleeping, or subjects just doing nothing. 
After the ten minutes, all participants were allowed to return 
to the main room and start the third and last questionnaire.
In the third questionnaire they had to complete 
individually, questions concerning the group dynamics were 
asked. The following is a list of these variables with a short 
description: Time-time spent on Questionnaire B, Effort-How 
much effort did they put Into the task, Search-whether 
subjects worked hard in searching for the best possible 
estimates, Each Crime-whether subjects worked on each crime
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individually, Rational-whether subjects used a rational 
approach in estimating, and Random-whether subjects 
randomly wrote down estimates. These questions reflected 
how the group measured their perceived effort. There was also 
a question asking subjects whether they liked working on the 
task by themselves or with their group (Like). And lastly, 
there was a question asking the overall confidence of their 
group's and individual accuracy (Overall Confidence) in all 
three questionnaires. Note that the same questions that were 
asked in the group task were also asked in the individual 
questionnaire with the exception of having them be on the 
individual level. After the participants completed 
questionnaire B or C, they were debriefed, thanked, and 
dism issed
Effort was manipulated by having or not having 
distracters in the four smaller rooms where each group 
answered the questionnaire together. Since there were four 
rooms, two rooms had distracters and the other two rooms had 
no distracters. Distracters consisted of visuals and objects. 
Visuals included comic strips on the walls or on the table, 
fashion catalogues, the daily school newspaper, and magazines. 
Objects inducted small hand games such as the Etch n' Sketch 
and larger games like Jenga and Labyrinth. The other two 
rooms had nothing but the table and three chairs provided.
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When there were times of imperfect attendance (N<12), 
groups of three were formed and the remaining subjects did 
the same group task individually. For example, if only 11 
subjects attended, three groups would have formed and one 
subject would go alone to one of the smaller rooms by him or 
herself (in the distracted or non-distracted condition. The 
other remaining subject would stay in the large room and it 
was considered to be an additional non-distracted room since 
there were no distracters present. They both would answer 
the second questionnaire individually. Thus, all data would 
have two main comparisons: group vs. individual and distracted 
vs. non-distracted.
Results
Confidence and accuracy were dependent variables in a 2 
Unit: group vs. individual X 2 Environment: distractsr vs. no 
distracter ANOVA. Analyses were with Units and Environment 
as be tween-subjects factor and others were with within- 
subjects factor. T-Tests were done for planned comparisons 
and post hoc multiple comparisons wsre anaiyzed using Tukey's 
method for the dependent variables accuracy and confidence.
Depending on the experimental condition, effort was 
manipulated by placing or not placing distracters in the 
subjects' rooms. To make sure these distracters were 
effective, a manipulation check was done by asking the
subjects to answer post-questionnaire questions. The 
difference between the means on the six post-questionnaire 
measures for each condition are shown in Table 1. Any him 
groups with a common alphabetical letter are not significantly 
different (p < .05).
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Insert Table 1 about here
A siphtbcs nt main effect between greup/distractee and 
greup/nen-distracted was found an eft the past-questionnaire
fihAAteMflNte be imk t h e  T iib a u 'e  rinalfcaii T9999Tlii”  TNI W*w 1 UIB| 9 I nwlTHIU, 1"
*SfeMNlN| inkfe bitettMtete n HeA emn*99^ 9 99e9PwNH» in® nOn*
«nfd m  ♦ aatifsa ifaq  BSIWS f t f i iL
the* te* no mmmm subjects rated these variables
significantly higher than the distrieter conditlan: time 
fN*a.|0 ve. ***?.n. t-O.OQO; dNdO.lt; p < .01), Effort (iu-2.30 
va. *«t-.gi, NO.OOO; dMO.OO; p < .05), Search (x<«2.33 vs. 
xnat.tft, NIOOO; dNOO.ft; p < .05), Each crime (x««2.30 vs 
Jt»»*.li, teOIH; dNSO.61; p « .05), Rational (x««2.5d vs. 
Xfi«3.05, t«0.000; df*IO,60; p < .01), Random (x«>2.37 vs. 
xk- 1.92, t-0 .001; df-59,60; p < 05). There das also a
significant interaction affect of Tima between the four
conditions. Overall, mean Time was significantly higher
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(p < .05) in the group/non-distracted condition than all the 
other conditions. Figures 4-9 displays the differences for 
these dependent variables.
Inse.t Figures 4# about tw o
It was hypplheiiiael that the non-distracted subjects 
would have hi^ sar canfidancs than the distracted subjects. 
Tuhey's method of multiple comparisons was also used to test 
for significant differences on the confidence rating measures: 
Uncertainty and Confidence Ratings for each questionnaire A.B, 
« t i C. From the Confidence Ratings measure, we compared 24 
confidence means (8 fnpw each questionnaire) between all four 
conditions. A t expected, there were no mein or interaction 
effects in Queattonnaire A because die manipulation was 
administered after Questionnaire A. However, there were 
Significant main effects between the group/distracted and 
group/non-distracted conditions. In both Questionnaires A and 
C, these two conditions were significantly different 62.5% it 
the time: or in other words, they were significantly diffsrant 
in 5 out of 8 scores for sach Questionnaire B and C. The 
greup/no distrecter confidence mean was significantly higher 
(p < .05) in aN comparisons. We did not, however, find similar 
significant differences between the individual/distracted and
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individual/non-distracted conditions. Tables 2-2a displays 
the main affects on both questionnaires.
Insert Tables 2-2a about here
None of the comparisons involving the Uncertainty measures 
revealed any significance.
In addition to Tukey's multiple comparison method, we 
used the two sample T-Tests to test for significant main 
effaets for the Confidence Rating measure. As expected, there 
were no significant main effects between the non-distracted 
and distracted conditions for Questionnaire A. But like before, 
we do see significant differences between these two groups 
when comparing Questionnaire B ami C. For Questionnaire B, 7 
out of 8 dependent confidence measures revealed the non- 
distracter condition as having significantly higher confidence 
ratings than the distracter condition: Sexual Assault 8 
Attempts (x<-4.12 vs. x*-5.39, >0.008; df-24,27; p < .05), 
Robbery (x««4.08 vs. x«-5.14, t-0.042; df-23,27; p < .05), 
Aggregated Battery (x«-4.04 vs. x—5.46, t-0.005: df-24,27; 
p < .05), Aggregated Assault (x<-3.75 vs. X.-5.29, t-0.004; 
df-23,27; p < .05), Battery: Commercial (x«-4.04 vs. X.-5.07, 
t-0.045; df-23,27; p < .05) Battery: Residential (x«-3.98 vs. 
ju- 5.26, t—0.013; df-23,26; p < .05), Theft: Under $300 (x«-3.75
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vs Xn-5.85, t-0.000; df-23,26; p < .05). We see similar results 
in Questionnaire C where 8 out ot 8 dependent confidence 
measure also revealed the no condition as having significantly 
higher confidence ratings than the distracted condition:
Murder & Attempts (x<«»4.60 vs. x««5.31, t-0.031; df-57,61;
P < 05) Sexual Assault & Attempts (x<-4.69 vs. x«-5.31, 
t»0.043; df-58,61; p < .05), Robbery (xa-4.35 vs. x««5.05, 
t-0.022; df-59,60; p < .05), Aggregated Battery (x<«4.44 vs. 
x»«5.08, t-0.033; df-58,60; p < .05), Aggregated Assault 
(x«-4.44 vs. X.-5.40, t-0.002: df-58,61; p < .05). Battery: 
Commercial (x«>4.38 vs. xm.5.11, t-0.018; df-59,61; p < .05) 
Battery: Residential (x««4.37 vs. Xi.-S.02, t-0.040: df-58.61;
P < .05), Theft: Under $300 (x«-4.82 vs. x»-5.53. t-0.028: 
df-59,61: p < .05). The no distracter condition also rated the 
dependent variable, Overall Confidence, significantly higher 
than the distracter condition (x«-4.10 vs. x-5 .21, t-0.000; 
df-60,61; p < .05). Figure 10 displays the differences between 
all four conditions for the Overall Confidence dependent 
measure.
Insert Figure 10 about here
The results of both Tukey's multiple comparison method and T- 
Test have supported our hypothesis that people with a low
level of effort (distracted subjects) will have lower 
confidence than people with a higher level of effort (nom 
distracted subjects).
Mean Confidence Ratings for each questionnaire were 
compared as a within-subjects factor. As we see in Figure 11, 
the non-distracted subjects became more confident in 
Questionnaire B while the distracted condition became less 
confident. This is where we see the significant difference 
between the two conditions. However, as the subjects go back 
to individually answering Questionnaire C, these two groups 
become more equal. For both the non-distracted and distracted 
conditions, there was a significant difference between 
Questionnaires A and 8  (p < .05) for the same subject. There 
was no significance found when comparing Questionnaire C for 
the non-distracted condition. But for the distracted group, 
Questionnaire C was significantly higher than Questionnaires A 
and B.
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Insert Figure 11 about here
We also used the two sample T-Tests to test for 
significant main effects for the Confidence Rating measure 
between individuals and groups. There were no significant 
differences between these two group in both Questionnaires A
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and C. In Questionnaire B, there were only 2 out of 8 dependent 
variables where groups fiad significantly higher confidence 
ratings: Burglary: Commercial (x«3.89 vs. xg-5 .00. t-0.038; 
d f-18,32; p < .05) and Burglary: Residential (*-3.84 vs. 
xg-5.13, t—0.019; df-18,31; p < .05). When comparing the post­
questionnaire dependent measures, groups had significantly 
higher scores for the Effort (xi-2.30 vs. xg-2.64, t-0.043; 
df-20,101; p < .05) and Each crime (*-2.86 vs. xg-2.42, 
t-0.035; df-20,101; p < .05) variables. Groups also rated the 
dependent variable, Overall Confidence, significantly higher 
than individuals (*-3.43 vs. xg-4.91, t-0.035; df-20,101;
P < .05). Refer back to Figure 9 for the Overall Confidence 
measure. For all the dependent measures from Questionnaires 
A, B, C and for the post-questionnaire questions, all the T-Test 
results are marginally significant for individuals vs. groups 
whereas it is moderately to extremely significant for the no 
distracter vs. distracter conditions.
There was also a couple significant differences when 
looking at the Like variable. The individual/non-distracted had 
significantly lower ratings than the group/distracted and 
group/non-distracted conditions. Although the individual/non- 
distracted was not significantly different from the 
individual/distracted condition, subjects in the 
individual/non-distracted condition still rated Like lower than
Task-Oriented Groups
75
the individual/distracter condition. Figure 12 displays the 
differences between all four conditions tor the Like variable.
Insert Figure 12 about here
Aside from measuring confidence, we also used post hoc 
tests to measure the dependent variable, accuracy. First, we 
checked for skewness and then computed log transformations 
for each estimate. Differences in judgment accuracy across 
conditions were assessed using Tukey's multiple comparison 
test with the absolute percent errors (APEs) for the 24 
estimates as the dependent measures. Despite differences in 
effort and confidence, there was no evidence that any of the 
conditions were significantly different in accuracy.
Correlations between the dependent variables: Overall 
Confidence, Time, and Effort were computed for ail subjects. 
The correlation between Overall Confidence and Time across 
the 123 subjects was positive and significant (r -  .51, 
p < .0002). The correlation between Overall Confidence and 
Effort was positive and significant (r • .71, p < .0002). The
correlation between Time and Effort was also positive and 
significant (r ■  .58, p < .0002).
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Discussion
This study revealed significant confidence differences 
between people who exerted a high level of effort and people 
who exerted a low level of effort. First, we hypothesized that 
the presence of distracters will divert the subjects' attention 
to different tasks other than the intended decision making 
task. Thus, level of effort was predicted to be low with 
distracters and high without distracters. Second, we 
hypothesized that subjects in the non-distracted condition 
(high effort) will show higher confidence levels than subjects 
in the distracted condition (low effort). And finally, we 
hypothesized that groups will be more confidant than 
individuals and will also outperform them in both the 
distracted and non-distracted conditions. This teas predicted 
since, in past studies, groups have performed better than 
individuals (Chalos and Pickard, 1985; Harkings, 1987; Latane, 
1986; Sniezek and Henry, 1989) in addition to having higher 
confidence levels (Davis and Ono, 1988; Memeth, 1986; Sniezek 
and Henry, 1989).
The manipulation of effort was successful since 
subjects in the non-distracted condition had significantly 
higher measures of effort than subjects who were in the 
distracted condition. This finding emphasizes the importance 
of considering what affects motivatton/effort for individuals
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and groups. Guzzo (1986) believes that there are many factors 
that could influence motivation in decision making such as the 
importance of the task, incentives, member involvement, and 
so on. In this particular study, it was difficult to provide 
monetary rewards because of limited funds. In addition, 
incentives were a problem since all subjects were given equal 
credit for just completing the experiment; it did not matter 
whether the subjects were interested in the topic or not. Yet, 
as we have seen here, there was an effect of distracters on 
motivation. Why? Here is one possible explanation. Recall 
that motivation/effort is a resource allocation process in 
which commitment in the form of time and energy is 
distributed across cefflfNHing acts. Providing distracters 
forced subjects to decide hoar they should distribute their 
effort across a variety of activities The distracters were 
vary attractive and fun, so in many cases subjects were 
diverted to these distracters instead of devoting most of their 
time and energy to the assigned task. In contrast, subjects 
who had no distracters had less choices of activities and 
therefore, committed most of their time and energy to the 
task. Of course, there were other activities in the non* 
distracted condition such as sleeping, doodling, biting nails, 
talking to other members of the group, etc., that the subject(s) 
could have chosen to do other than the task. However, the
important difference between the distracted and non- 
distracted conditions is that in the distracted condition, there 
were m ore competing acts to choose from.
Another possible explanation would be that subjects 
measured their effort by evaluating how much time they spent 
on the task. Results revealed that the distracted condition 
spant the least amount of time on Questionnaire B This may 
be an issue of work vs. play. In this particular study, it was 
observed that once subjects have seen the distracters, they 
finished their task (work) as quickly as possible and then 
spent the rest of their time with the distracters (play). These 
subjects, when they had the opportunity and when the 
consequences were minimal, have chosen play over work. The 
observed differences of effort would support such an 
interpretation. This observation, however, should not be a 
general rule of thumb. People often can and do choose work 
over play. The decision of what to do first, work vs. play, is 
dependent on many factors which include what people do at 
work and what the relative incentives are. Thus, future 
research on motivation should address the role of appealing 
distracters in the presence of an intended task.
In terms of how the level of effort affects confidence, 
the present study appears to support the second hypothesis: 
subjects who exerted more effort toward the task will be
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more confident than subjects who exerted less effort toward 
the same task. There are a number of reasons as to why people 
may feel over or under confident about their choices or 
judgments such as confirmation bias, feedback, having 
expertise on the subject, framing, etc. Results show that the 
distracted condition spent less time on the task than the non- 
distracted condition. This is, however, inconsistent with
previous research of Sniezek (1990) showing that greater time
and effort exerted by an individual will reduce their subjective 
uncertainty. The present study supports the idea that if people 
felt that they have spent a considerable amount of time and 
effort toward a taalt, they may feel more confidant than they 
waufd have felt if they spent less time and effort on the same 
taek. However, this interpretation should not be used as a 
generalization. Tina can be explained by a simple scenario: if 
a biology profaoMf and a history prefesso' h id  to tttke I  H it
p h m tf  y h ln f t i f  n r n f i i l i f  jd H  t t f f l t l i i l i i f  M il ♦ h i•toWwl w lllf  IfiPfPlwP* w*™ §*?wlPd™rg IfH| topWWmi Iffw
same amaant of tone and g lltft in sM yto t tor th i test Is  the
hifttati* AM ikfttiif uai mil h ifitiiit t**m**i***m urn arahAku# estdt l t t o w f y  |P I V IW U W I * y W l w w  |Waa w lU P m m  H V ”
ai^ AJHideftie'aenHto la faaaadi^ ksihtoiaA Ida Aa^bda daa 
AMMbaafkd afe^  J| id ffe a^
the snvironmtfM (i.s. th i skills and aMMea el toe
individuals), and indivldudt dWferenoaa (i.s.. s it  eenddanee).
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Addressing the distracted vs. non-distracted conditions for 
accuracy, these two groups also did not show any significant 
difference. Even though the non-distracted condition was more 
confident, they were no more accurate than the distracted 
condition. This result is consistent with past research: 
increased confidence in judgments does not necessarily 
increase judgment accuracy (Gigerenzer et a!., 1992; Sniezek, 
1991). Since the distracted subjects did just as well as the 
non-distracted subjects in terms of accuracy, we can say that 
the ron-distracted subjects were overconfident about their 
estimates.
Given the significant differences between the distracted 
and non-distracted conditions, the question remains as to why 
groups did hot outperform individuals. One possible 
explanation is that the large variances of estimates presents a 
strong signal that the task was difficult. This may have 
inhibited further information processing of the subject, who 
instead resorts to a choice heuristic for problems involving 
luck rather than skill. Possible heuristics may involve 
guessing or for a group, taking the mean. Another possibility 
is apathy or lack of interast. Since subjects had to attend this 
experiment to fulfill a class requirement, they may have come 
into the experiment with a negative attitude. Although they 
may have been capable of making educated estimates, they
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probably did not concentrate on the task as much as they would 
have if they voluntarily signed up for the experiment. In terms 
of confidence, there were only three times out of twenty-five 
where groups were significantly more confident than 
individuals. The possible explanations may be similar as to 
why there was no significant differences in accuracy for 
individuals and groups.
In summary, the pattern of results obtained here 
demonstrates the complexity of the relationship between 
motivation/effort and confidence. Some studies do investigate 
those two components in detail, but very few, if any, have 
addressed the re la tio n sh ip  between them. In this study, this 
relationship has been shown to exist. As we have discussed, 
confidence can be influenced by an endless number of 
variables. Any one study will necessarily be limited in the 
number of factors that can be examined. In this study, we have 
chosen to control effort for die opportunity to understand 
better the effects it has on confidence. Future endeavors at 
understanding this relationship may uncover more conditions 
that cause people to adjust their confidence in a decision 
making teak.
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Table t
Mean Post Questionnaire Scores Thal_Mcasurc Level of Effort
Dependent Variable: TIME
GROUPING MEAN .N.., CONDITION
A 5.00 10 ID
B 7.18 l 1 IN
C 5.27 5 1 CD
D 7.84 5 1 GN
Dependent Variable: EFFORT
■m> » «*> w *■» *-* —» ~ -•
GROUPING MEAN N CONDITION
A 2.20 1 0 ID
A 2.40 10 IN
A 2.31 5 t CD
B 2.98 5 1 CN
Dependent Variable: SEARCH
GROUPING MEAN ..N ..... CONDITION
A B 2.40 1 0 ID
A B 2.45 i l IN
A 2.31 5 l GD
B 2.94 5 l CN
Dependent Variable: T aT rTm i:
GROUPING MEAN N- CONDITION
A B 2.HO 10 ID
A B 2.91 l 1 IN
A 2.20 5 1 GD
B 2.65 5 1 CN
Dependent Variable: RATIONAL
GROUPING MEAN .... ~N CONDITION
A B 2.70 10 ID
A B 3.00 10 IN
A 2.53 5 1 GD
B 3.06 5 1 CN
Dependent Variable: RANDOM
GROUPING . MEAN N......
A B 2.30 to ID
A B 2.40 to IN
A 2.38 50 GD
B 1.82 St ON
Note. ID * Individual/Distracted; IN * Individual/Not Distracted; GD •  1
GN * Group/ Not Distracted. Any two groups with a common alphabetical
significantly different (p < .05).
Table 2
Mean Confidence Scores of Questionnaire B
T ask -O rien ted  G roups
9 0
Dependent Variable: MURDER * ATTEMPTS CONFIDENCE SCORE
GROUPING N CONDITION
A 4.5ft 9 ID
A 4.IK II IN
A 4,13 16 GD
A 5.71 17 CM
p^endent” VariaWe": SEXtML~ ASSAULTS” "ATTEMPTS* V onViDENCE SCORE
GROUPING MEAN N CONDITION
A B 4.22 9 ID
A B 4.91 1 1 IN
A 4.06 1 6 GD
B 5.71 17 CM
Dependent Variable: ROBBERY CONFIDENCE SCORE
GROUPING MEAN N CONDITION
A 4.25 H ID
A 4.45 1 1 IN
A 4.00 1 6 GD
A 5.59 17 ON
Dependent Variable: AGGREGATED BATTERY CONFIDENCE SCORE
GROUPING MEAN .........N. CONDITION
A 4.22 9 ID
A B 4.45 1 1 IN
A 3.94 1 6 GD
B A. 12 1 7 CM
Dependent Variable: "aggregated""assault CONFIDENCE SCORE
GROUPING MEAN N ..._ CONDITION
A B 3.A3 8 ID
A B 4.73 1 1 IN
A 3.81 16 CD
B 5.65 17 CM
Dependent Variable: BURGLARY: COMMERCIAL’cONFIDENcY ’ sCORE""
GROUPING N CONDITION
A 3.63 8 ID
A B 4.09 1 1 IN
A  B 4.25 16 CD
B 5.71 17 CM
Dependent Variable: BURGLARY: RESIDENTIAL CONFIDENCE SCORE
GROUPING MEAN -N CONDITION
A 3.50 8 ID
A 4.09 1 1 IN
A 4.19 16 CD
B 6.06 16 CM
T ask -O rien ted  G ro u p s
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Dependent Variable: THEFT: UNDER UN CONFIDENCE SCORE
R^OUPING KHAN N CONDITION
k:4> 3.13 & ID
A B 4.82 l 1 IN
A 4.06 16 GD
B 6.56 1 6 CM
Note. ID * Individuai/Dtstracted; IN * Individual/Not Distracted; GD a Group/Distracted: 
GN * Group/ Not Distracted. Any two groups woh a common alphabetical letter are not 
significantly different (p < .05).
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Table 2a
Mean Confidence Scores of Questionnaire C
Dependent Variable: MURDER * ATTEMPTS CONFIDENCE SCORE
MEAN N M i
A B 4.5 b 9 ID
A B 4.19 11 IN
A 4.61 4 9 CD
B 5.55 5 l CN
Dependent Variable: s e Vu a l a s ’sa  uLt s ft* ATTi M P T t t^ N P lB E
GROUPING MEAN N ._... CONDITION
. . A '' 4.78 9 ID
A 4.64 11 IN
A 4.68 5 0 CD
A 5.45 5 i 09
Dependent Variable: 1J o b b e r y  c o n f id e n c e  sc ORE
GROUPING MEAN N CONDITION
A 4.35 9 ID
A 4.60 10 IN
A 4.35 5 1 CD
A 5.14 5 1 CN
SCORE
Dependent Variable: AGGREGATED BATTERY CONFIDENCE SCORE
GROUPING MEAN N CONDITION
A 4.33 9 ID
A B 4.09 i 1 IN
A 4.46 50 GD
B 5.30 50 CN
Dependent Variable: AGGREGATED ASSAULT CONFIDENCE SCORE
GROUPING MEAN N . CONDITION
A B 4.56 9 ID
A B 5.IB 1 l IN
A 4.42 50 CD
B 5.45 51 CN
Dependent Variable: BURGLARY: COMMERCIAL CONFIDENCE SCORE
GROUPING MEAN N CONDITION
A B 4.56 9 ID
A B 4.27 t ! IN
A 4.35 51 CD
B 5.29 51 CN
Dependent Variable: BURGLARY: RESIDENTIAL CONFIDENCE SCORE
GROUPING MEAN N CONDITION
A B 4.33 9 ID
A 3.82 t 1 IN
A 4.38 50 CD
B 5.27 51 CN
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Dependent Variable. THEFT: UNDER $300 CONFIDENCE SCORE
GROUPING MEAN CONDITION
a 4.89 ID
A 4.82 1 t IN
A 4.80 5 1 CD
A 5.69 5 t ON
Note. ID '* Individual/Distracted; IN = Indivtdual/Noi Distracted: GD * Group/Distr acted; 
ON * Group/ Not Distracted. Any two groups with a common alphabetical letter are not 
significantly different tp < .05).
Figure Caption
F igure 1. McGrath's group task circumplex model (McGrath,
1984).
Figure 2. Locke's motivation sequence, hub, and core.
Figure 3. Three contingencies at which judgments occur in the 
Naylor. Pritchard and llgen's theory of motivation: NPI Theory
(Naylor et al., 1980).
Figure 4. Mean time (minings) spent on the decision making 
task which was Questionnaire B. (Maximum time = 10 
m in u tes).
Figure 5. Mean level of effort subjects believed khey put forth 
on the decision making task (Questionnaire B). (Maximum level 
of effort = 4).
Figure 6. Mean scores regarding how hard subjects searched 
for the best possible estim ates throughout the experiment.
(I = did not work hard: 4 = worked hard).
Figure 7. Mean scores regarding whether subjects worked on 
each crime individually. (1 = did not at all; 4 = did so a lot).
Figure 8. Mean scores regarding whether subjects used a 
rational approach in estimating each crime. (I = did not use;
4 = used).
Figure 9. Mean scores rearding whether subjects randomly 
wrote down their estimates. (1 = did not randomly write down 
estim ates; 4 = did randomly write down estimates).
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Figure 10. Mean overall confidence scores throughout the 
experiment. (1 = not at all confident; 9 = very confident). 
Figure 11. Mean confidence scores of Questionnaires A, B. and 
C for the distracted .nd not distracted conditions. 
(Questionnaire A was given first. Questionnaire B second, and 
Questionnaire C was given last).
F igure 12. Mean scores regarding whether subjects enjoyed 
the experiment. (0 = did not enjoy; 2 = dH enjoy)
m m m m m m — .... -^ I l H
1m  1. Planning tasks: Generating plans, £.§,: ) laokman‘s 
tomblem-solving* task type. Kay notion: Action-Oriented
Typo 2. Creativity Tasks: Qonoratins ideas. E.g.: Hackman1* 
•production* tasks; ’brainstorming* tasks. Koy notion: 
Creativity.
QUADRANT II: CHOOSE
Typo 3. Intellective Teaks; Solving problems with a eorroct 
answer. E.g.: Laughlin's intoUoctlvs tasks, with oorroct 
answer ami oompoiling answers; logie problems and other 
problem-solving tasks with oorreet but not oompoiling 
answers; tasks for which eapert consensus defines answer.
Key notion: Correct answer.
Type 4. Decision-Making Tasks: Dealing with tasks tor which 
the preferred or agreed upon answer is the correct one. E.g.: 
tasks used in risky shift, choice shift, and polarization 
studies; juries. Key notion: Preferred answer
QUADRANT ill: NEGOTIATE
Type 8. Cognitive Conflict Tasks: Resolving oonflicts of 
viewpoint (not of interests). E.g.: oognitive conflict tasks 
used in social judgment theory work; some jury tasks. Koy 
notion: Resolving policy conflicts.
Typo 6. Mixed-Motive Tasks: Resolving conflicts of motive- 
interest. E.g.: negotiations and bargaining tasks; mixed- 
motive dilemma tasks; ooalltion formatlon/reward allocation 
tasks. Key notion: Resolving pay-off oonflicts.
QUADRANTIV: EXECUTE
Typo 7. Contests/Batties: Resolving oonfUots of power; 
oompeting for victory. E.g.: wars, all winner-take-aii 
oofifuotSt oompiuuvt w y  fiowswi* wwium i^#
Typo 8. Portormanoas: Psyohomotor tasks performed against 
objective or absolute standards of exoellenee, e.g.. many 
physical tasks; soma sports events. Key notion: Excelling.
Ffeura 1 QU*CmiTt.TAS(T>m^Krf(X3NnrT8C)FT>«tWCMBUMPlIX
REWAAOS «•> SATISFACTION
AoAAfOMO* * ¥tOooaI Ww
Equity Theory; Factor Theory;
ReirUoreemertt MaokriiafvOttfhofft; 
Thoory; aiao JoO Charactertatfc 
Ooa Thoory Thoory
Looho* SiOaiiottori 
Thoory; atao
iiaoliMM ThiUV
4 Social- 
Cognitive 
Thoory
mF*imCACT4
EXPECTANCY
OsMfeUtm*wwoe^ i^^ o^s# qj^ i^wwosir eagow^^
TH E MOTIVATION SEQUENCE
FIGURE 3: SOME EXAMPLES OF CONTINGENCY FUNCTIONAL RELATIONSHIPS
1. ACT • TO - PRODUCT RELATIONSHIPS. WHERE X -  PRODUCT, C • COMMITMENT. AND X • »(C)
A B C D E
Amount
of the -  X
Product
Amount
of the - X
Product
u
0 / :
HI
■--- - 0
HI
-------- - 0
___ _ HI
0
c HI Q HI C HI HI C HI
Resources Committed to the Act • C
F
HI f _ —
0 ____
0 HI
Resource* Committed to the Act -  C
2. PRODUCT - TO • EVALUATION RELATIONSHIPS. WHERE E • EVALUATION. X • PRODUCT, AND E • f(X)
Favorablenest 
of the -E  
Eveluetlon
Pevorableness 
ofthe -E  
Evaluation
K h m
Amount of ate Product • X
0 P 0
S. EVALUATION • TO • OUTCOME RELATIONSHIPS, WHERE 0 - OUTCOME. E - EVALUAT iON. AND 0 • HE)
K S T U
Level Ht /  H» HI HIof ate *0 /
Outaome /
0 L__ © 0 — —  0
0 + - 0 + - 0 + - 0  +
FavocaWeneoe of ate Evaluation «E
Figure 4 TIME SPENT ON QUESTIONNAIRE B
■  DISTRACTED 
0  NON-OISTRACTEC
CONDITION
Figure 5 EFFO RT
■  DISTRACTED 
0  NON-OISTRACTEC
GROUP INDIVIDUAL
CONDITION
Figure 6 SEARCH
GROUP INDIVIDUAL
DISTRACTED
NON-DISTRACT5C
CONDITION
Figure 7 EACH CRIME
DISTRACTED
NON-DISTRACTED
Figure 8 RATIONAL
■  DISTRACTED 
□  NON-DISTRACTEC
Figure RANDOM
GROUP INDIVIDUAL
CONDITION
□
DISTRACTED
NON-DISTRACTED
iwilll8*I §|j|jl IS*
4
.3
1
FIGURE 10 OVERALL CONFIDENCE
GROUP INDIVIDUAL
■  DISTRACTED 
0  NON-DISTRACTEC
CONDITION
Figure 11 MEAN CONFIDENCE RATINGS
QUESTIONNAIRE (TIME)
OISTftftCTIO
NON-OISTRfICTtO
LI
K
E
Figure 12 ENJOYMENT OF EXPERIMENT
GROUP INDIVIDUAL
DISTRACTED
NON-DISTRACTED
CONDITION
I. L A r r t i M / i A
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS
CONDITION 1: GROL'P/NOS-mSTR ACTED
GENERAL INSTRJCTIONS
In your packet you will find the following • consent 
form, two questionnaires libeled A and I. and • pen Please make 
sure you have all of these items. If you are missing any of them, 
inform the experimenter at this time
These art the general instructions for this experiment 
Head them thoroughly and further instructions will be given later
ttfc ili  lUed carefully ^  ^  g* consent form.
Pill out questionnaire A individually.
tX IC J  Aftar completing questionnaire A, you will form 
groups of three which will be determined by the color of 
your poker chip, lied  chips will go to room oat, 
blue cblpc to ta o »  le e , yellow chips to  
* * •*  three, end g reet c lip s  to room four.
When you ere in you group end in your assigned room, 
them will be * queatiomunre on the table for your group
' '^ g^aja'' mMnaaedlik SMAwanemw -wftananm l§ owavwneaddnMB Tki. # La ■ IP WlwSI* kiWi prvwjr v iW it Iw P  SB pvT|Qvi> I ful w
the same euisiionnaira as flussuMMiiic A hut vou will be■Wpt^ er . oraeoeew. weoeweue^ueooeo.. tr^ s. ■ 'Uoapw wpsp e ®e
You witt nwwtf tte  quwiioM u> 
Kit hill of yew prupi toowMt*. YOt'R GROUP 
CAN ONLY IPEND 10 MINUTES WORKING 
ON THE QUESTIONNAIRE. Mm 4mm  nunuut.
At o«—owurmaa will Qumo aatlort VflAtf ftoun'c ttitvcr■'tae^ wp awoe,^ wo^ ^^ u^u. town w y^wpouas ^^sowp^ v^wp .^p ; .:^ w^aiw pp. aoe.
sheet.
H ie A M erineiae «*»itt t*u wm wIwm to  *****:■:/»■BSR^VPwliBBrvBoSwwPPkiPe . ^Wggg O^pgg .gySShS ^V^gSRnk...SSP we^SSa
~ You will «n»w# this individually
INSTRUCTIONS,
COXQITION 3; IXPIVIPIAL/NO N-PISTR ACTED
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS
In your packet you will find the following: a consent 
form, two questionnaires labeled A and C, and • pen Picas* make 
sure you have all of these items If you are missing any of them, 
inform the experimenter at this time
These are the general instructions for this experiment 
Read them thoroughly and further instructions will be given later
STEP 1: Read carefully and sign the consent farm
Fill out questionnaire A individually
ST^P 3: After conr pleiing questionnaire A, you will 
work on questionnaire B which the experimenter will 
give to you later The experimenter will then assign you 
to a room. YOL MIST SPEND 10 MINUTES 
WORKING ON THIS TASK. After the 10 minutes, 
the experimenter will collect your questionnaire.
STEP 4: the experimenter will tell you whwtto sun 
questionnaire C.
YOL HAVE READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS, 
PLEASE START STEP 1
CONDITION 4t f XPIV1PLAL/DISTtACTED
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS
In your packet you will find the following: •  consent 
form, two questionnaires labeled A and C, and a pen. Please make 
sure you have all of lhase items. If you arc misting any of them, 
inform the experimenter at this time.
These are the tenetal instructions for this exuurimiMmw r Y P P *  ”  - ^ P P '  ” -^p w  -ep^ px,'. ■.
ihoroufhly m 4 te tte r  tawuciiont will te  |iv m  tear.
g ift-
dRRMWRB ihda^kg^ jWllPP#* «WPb *ww|F^ *Wp ^ ipp|mpgiP|^ 'fia jWw
(h i
WCVER YOV WANTTO. Ater fetOmiMiM.
nasutlea^oiae1 - jftaAlznkjfcO xsadawww jnaaduao£jwawtfiA.HAw ty"w*pWp»lflraPill^ W Wrwfw w®itMP»o Jr^ wB* fqlPwBuJhpillwBipmp
USEi:
questionnaire C.
ONCE YOU HAVE tK A ft THESE
PLEASE IT  ART STEP »
i-ts- i u . . • •-■  iiSt-fi’ ,-
APPENDIX i
EXAM PLE OF A QUESTIONNAIRE QUESTION
MURDER & ATTEMPTS
Definition: A wrongful death of a person.
1. According to the information given, how many murder and 
murder attempts will be committed in December 1992?
My single best ESTIMATE is .
There is a 90% chance that the actual value lies between
■ ' : ■/ a n d  : . ... : ■ .
Kfy COttfitfehcg in the accuracy of my ESTIMATE is:
(£ {« : !»  one n u m b er <h > the K a le )
